This case has been cited 17 times or more.
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2014-04-21 |
REYES, J. |
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| First, the Court retains the award by the CA of P75,000.00 as moral damages, exemplary damages at P30,000.00 and civil indemnity at P75,000.00 to the heirs of Orlando Legaspi, Sr. (Orlando, Sr.) in conformity with our ruling in People v. Barde.[13] Next, the Court awards moral and exemplary damages to Junior in the amounts of P50,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively. Furthermore, the Court upholds the CA's award of P115,956.00 as actual damages for the hospital expenses of both Orlando Sr. and Junior. Lastly, the Court imposes an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the award of civil indemnity and all damages from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.[14] | |||||
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2013-11-13 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is committed by any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another with any of the enumerated qualifying circumstances including treachery and conspiracy. In a litany of cases, this Court has consistently explained that there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense that the offended party might make.[29] In People v. Barde,[30] we stated that the essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done swiftly and unexpectedly, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. | |||||
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2013-10-09 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Time and again, we have ruled that factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the CA, are conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record.[9] In numerous instances, this Court observes restraint in interfering with the trial court's assessment of the witnesses' credibility, absent any indication or showing that the trial court overlooked some material facts or gravely abused its discretion, more so, when the CA sustained such assessment, as in this case, where it affirmed the trial court's findings of fact, the veracity of the testimonies of the witnesses, the determination of physical evidence and conclusions. | |||||
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2013-09-18 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| After a thorough review of the testimonies of all the witnesses and other evidence presented, we find no reason to disturb the findings of fact of the trial court. As we have held time and again, factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record.[45] In People v. Sapigao, Jr.,[46] we explained the reason for this rule:It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. These are important in determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining the witness' credibility, and the trial court has the opportunity and can take advantage of these aids. These cannot be incorporated in the record so that all that the appellate court can see are the cold words of the witness contained in transcript of testimonies with the risk that some of what the witness actually said may have been lost in the process of transcribing. As correctly stated by an American court, "There is an inherent impossibility of determining with any degree of accuracy what credit is justly due to a witness from merely reading the words spoken by him, even if there were no doubt as to the identity of the words. However artful a corrupt witness may be, there is generally, under the pressure of a skillful cross-examination, something in his manner or bearing on the stand that betrays him, and thereby destroys the force of his testimony. Many of the real tests of truth by which the artful witness is exposed in the very nature of things cannot be transcribed upon the record, and hence they can never be considered by the appellate court." (Citations omitted.) | |||||
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2013-07-17 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Time and again, we have ruled that factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record.[11] In numerous instances, this Court observes restraint in interfering with the trial court's assessment of the witnesses' credibility, absent any indication or showing that the trial court overlooked some material facts or gravely abused its discretion, more so, when the CA sustained such assessment. In the case at bench, we have scoured the records for any indication of arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence that would warrant a reversal of the factual findings of the courts a quo. However, we found none. | |||||
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2013-07-03 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Furthermore, we have time and again ruled that factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record.[21] | |||||
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2013-01-23 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| It is a time-honored principle that the positive identification of the appellant by a witness destroys the defense of alibi and denial.[27] Thus: x x x It is well-entrenched that alibi and denial are inherently weak and have always been viewed with disfavor by the courts due to the facility with which they can be concocted. They warrant the least credibility or none at all and cannot prevail over the positive identification of the appellant by the prosecution witnesses.[28] For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law.[29] Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating justification[,] is inherently weak and if uncorroborated regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[30] In this case, Romeo positively identified the appellants, whom he both knew since he was a child,[31] thereby rendering the defenses of alibi and denial weak. Certainly, it was not physically impossible for appellant Abundio to be at the hilly portion of Sitio Liki where Pablo was attacked, the same being only a kilometer away from his own house and two (2) kilometers away from the farm where he and his father allegedly were on that fateful day. Appellant Benjamin's bare denial, on the other hand, is definitely self-serving. It cannot stand against the positive identification of an unbiased and credible witness. | |||||
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2012-12-10 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Moreover, in view of the presence of aggravating circumstances, namely the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle, the award of P30,000.00 exemplary damages to the respective heirs of the deceased victims is also correct.[60] In addition, it cannot be denied that the heirs of the deceased victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved with certainty. Thus, the award of P25,000.00 temperate damages to the heirs of each deceased victim is appropriate.[61] | |||||
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2012-09-11 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Time and again, this Court held that when the issues revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they are telling the truth.[51] Moreover, credibility, to state what is axiomatic, is the sole province of the trial court. In the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case, the trial court's findings on the matter of credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.[52] A careful perusal of the records of this case revealed that none of these circumstances is attendant herein. | |||||
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2012-07-30 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Pursuant to recent jurisprudence, this Court is increasing the award of civil indemnity from Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) for each count of Murder[53] as well as decreasing the award of moral damages from Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for each count of Murder[54] and from Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) for each count of Attempted Murder.[55] Furthermore, in accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code,[56] exemplary damages should be awarded in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) for each count of Murder[57] as well as for each count of Attempted Murder.[58] | |||||
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2012-04-16 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| We see no reason to overturn the findings on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. It has been long settled that when the issues raised concern the credibility of a witness, the trial court's findings of fact, its calibration of testimonies, and its assessment of the testimonies' probative weight, including its conclusions based on said findings, are generally given conclusive effect. It is acknowledged that the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they are telling the truth.[24] Furthermore, accused-appellant failed to show why Maniego and her mother would falsely accuse her of committing a terrible crime. Maniego was the common-law spouse of the victim and she would naturally want to seek justice for his death as well as the injury sustained by her mother. | |||||
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2011-09-07 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In the face of Mendeja's positive identification of Villacorta as Cruz's stabber, Villacorta could only muster an uncorroborated denial. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating justification, is inherently weak and if uncorroborated, regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[20] | |||||
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2011-08-22 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| As to the issue raised on the weight of the prosecution's evidence, the matter boils down to the credibility of the witnesses against accused-appellant. The assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.[15] We adhere to the rule that when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court,[16] unless the trial court had overlooked, disregarded, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and significance which, if considered, would have altered the result of the case.[17] An examination of the records shows that none of the aforementioned circumstances applies. | |||||
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2011-08-22 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| In sustaining the findings of the trial court, We uphold settled jurisprudence that denial, like alibi, constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[19] | |||||
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2011-07-06 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Furthermore, we have time and again ruled that factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record. [45] It was the trial court that was able to observe the demeanors of the witnesses, and is consequently in a better position to determine which of the witnesses are telling the truth. Thus, this Court, as a general rule, would not review the factual findings of the courts a quo, except in certain instances such as when: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings of the trial court; (9)the Court of Appeals manifestlyoverlookedcertain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. [46] | |||||
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2011-06-13 |
SERENO, J. |
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| The legal doctrine that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is left to the judgment of the trial court is well-established. [32] Its findings of facts, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are deemed conclusive on this Court. [33] In this case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the prosecution witnesses credible. | |||||
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2010-08-09 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Petitioners, together with the oppositors, filed a motion for reconsideration,[26] which the probate court denied, drawing them to appeal to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA G.R. No. 83094. | |||||