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EUGENIO FELICIANO v. PEDRO CANOZA

This case has been cited 4 times or more.

2012-06-20
REYES, J.
Indeed, courts may motu proprio dismiss a claim even if the defendant failed to raise the defense of prescription as long as the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period are apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record. Thus, in Feliciario v. Canoza,[16] we stressed that: We have ruled that trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred x x x; and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss, or an answer which-sets up such ground as an affirmative defense; or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration; or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings, or where a defendant has been declared in default. What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period, be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiffs complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence.[17] (Emphasis supplied)
2011-05-30
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
In Feliciano v. Canoza,[28] we held: We have ruled that trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred x x x; and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss, or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense; or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration; or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings, or where a defendant has been declared in default. What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period, be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiffs complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence.[29] (Emphasis supplied.)
2008-09-11
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
It is very clear from the document[45] signed by both petitioner and private complainant that private complainant shall invest P3,500,000.00 in the development of parcel of land (owned by petitioner and located at Agusan, Cagayan de Oro City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 61746) into a low-cost housing subdivision to be undertaken by petitioner. It is apparent from the face of the document that the land to be developed is located in Agusan, Cagayan de Oro.
2003-06-19
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
SO ORDERED.[5] Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 61746.[6]  Meanwhile, on October 31, 2000, the trial court issued an Entry of Judgment over the Partial Judgment dated August 7, 2000 as modified by the Omnibus Order dated October 11, 2000.[7]  Subsequently, respondent Heirs filed a Motion for Execution, which was granted on November 22, 2000.