This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2004-01-20 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| A qualifying circumstance like treachery changes the nature of the crime and increases the imposable penalties for the offense. Hence, like the delict itself, it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[54] In the instant case, we find insufficient the prosecution's evidence to prove that the attack on the victim came without warning and that he had absolutely no opportunity to defend himself, or to escape. None of the prosecution witnesses could know how the attack was initiated or carried out, simply because there was no eyewitness to the offense. In addition, appellant's narration in his taped interview with Channel 7 is not too clear on this point, thus: ERIC GUILLERMO: Mura pa rin ng mura. Nagtataka ako kung bakit ganoon na lamang kainit ito. Bigla niya akong inano dito sa batok ko tapos itinuturo niya ang dito ko (pointing to his head) itinuturo-turo niya ang dito ko. Ayon mura ng mura, hindi ko napigilan ang sarili ko, dinampot ko iyong kahoy. ARNOLD CLAVIO: Sa mga oras na 'yon, nagdilim, napuno ng galit ang kanyang mga mata, nakita niya ang isang dos por dos sa kanyang tabi at agad dinampot habang nakatalikod ang kanyang amo. ERIC GUILLERMO: Nang gawin ko sa sarili ko iyon kalmadong kalmado ako noong ginawa ko 'yon. Nasa sarili ako noong ginawa ko iyon. ARNOLD CLAVIO: Hawak ang mahabang kahoy, hinampas ni Eric si Mr. Keyser, hinampas hanggang sa mawalan ng malay. Tila hindi pa nakuntento sa kanyang nagawa, napagbalingan naman ni Eric ang isang lagare sa kanyang tabi at isinagawa na ang karumal-dumal na krimen.[55] From the foregoing, all that can be discerned is that the victim was scolding the appellant, and the victim's back was turned towards the appellant when the latter picked up the piece of wood. It does not, however, show that there was any deliberate effort on the part of the appellant to adopt the particular means, method, or form of attack to ensure the commission of the crime without affording the victim any means to defend himself. | |||||
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2002-07-23 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| might make.[42] It is settled that there is treachery if the victim, when killed, was sleeping[43] or had just awakened,[44] because in such cases the victim was in no position to put up any form of defense. However, the prosecution must still establish how the attack commenced.[45] When Mrs. Bates went out of the house to call Danilo, she saw appellant already attacking her son who was lying on the bench. She claimed that her son was sleeping, but presented no evidence to show that he was actually asleep when attacked and thus had no opportunity to defend himself. Where no particulars are known regarding the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the victim's death began and developed, it cannot be established from mere supposition that the accused perpetrated the killing with treachery.[46] Any doubt as to the existence of the treachery must be resolved in favor of the accused.[47][47] Note that the information also alleged "evident premeditation." Our perusal of the records, however, fails to disclose any factual basis for the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. Evident premeditation may not be appreciated where there is no proof as to how | |||||
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2001-03-28 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Significantly, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals accepted the testimony of state witness Andres Tello as convincing and credible. In not disturbing this finding, we adhere to the time-honored principle that findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect, and even finality, unless said findings are arbitrary, or facts and circumstances of weight and influence have been overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied by the trial judge which, if considered, would have affected the case.[14] | |||||
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2001-03-16 |
DE LEON, JR., J. |
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| As to the amount of damages awarded, this Court reiterates that prevailing jurisprudence[49] sets the amount of the civil indemnity in rape cases to P50,000.00, when the penalty meted is reclusion perpetua. However, when rape is qualified and committed under any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is imposed, the amount of P75,000.00 is applicable. | |||||
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2000-11-17 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Prevailing jurisprudence[54] sets the amount of the civil indemnity in rape cases to P75,000.00, when committed under and effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is imposed. Where the penalty meted is reclusion perpetua, the amount of P50,000.00 is applicable.[55] Thus, the victim, Jenalyn Mariano, should be awarded as and for civil indemnity the sum of P75,000.00 for each count of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 10344-SP and 10345-SP and the sum of P50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 10343-SP. | |||||
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2000-10-12 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Petitioners' arguments, however, are far from persuasive. To begin with, this Court is not a trier of facts. Absent any showing that the findings of the trial court are unsupported by evidence on record or are arbitrary, we find no reason to depart from the rule that the determination of the credibility of witnesses who testified at the trial of the case is properly within the province of the trial court. Said court occupies the vantage position to observe their demeanor on the witness stand, an opportunity denied appellate courts.[10] Findings of the trial court respecting the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and even finality, especially where these findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.[11] | |||||
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2000-10-05 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| However, after close scrutiny of the records, we are not fully persuaded that treachery qualified the crime. For treachery to be appreciated, two essential elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the said means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate.[33] In this case, there is no clear showing that Gedie could not defend himself when he was attacked. Note that there were two stabbing incidents, the first by Hilot and the second by Bihag. The time elapsed between the first and second incidents, however, was not significant. For Gerundino immediately rushed to the kitchen in response to Gedie's cry for help. Hilot had wounded Gedie in the chest. Nonetheless, Gedie continued his struggle against Hilot. Gedie was aided then by his father who had grabbed, disarmed and pinned Hilot to the floor. Gedie backed up against the kitchen wall. This was when the kitchen door opened and appellant appeared and stabbed Gedie in the neck. Although wounded, it was not established that Gedie was already incapacitated from offering any resistance or defense, particularly with the aid of his father, when the second stabbing occurred. He had, after all, just fought Hilot valiantly. He had to be on guard against the possibility that the latter might get loose from Gerundino's hold. Nor could he discount the possibility that Hilot had a confederate waiting to join the assault. In short, the victim was aware of further dangers to life and limb. The fact that the attacker used a bladed weapon did not per se make the attack treacherous. Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself.[34] Any doubt as to the existence of treachery must be resolved in favor of the accused.[35] Absent clear and convincing proof of treachery, appellant can only be convicted of homicide. | |||||
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2000-07-24 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Indeterminate Sentence Law and in the presence of the modifying circumstance of recidivism, the maximum penalty to be imposed shall be taken from the maximum period of the imposable penalty which is reclusion temporal maximum, the range of which is seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor in any of its periods, the range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. As to the amount of damages, prevailing jurisprudence[59] sets the civil indemnity for death in the amount of P50,000.00, which can be awarded without need of further proof other than the death of the victim. With respect to the award of actual damages | |||||