This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2013-06-19 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Fraud is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, resulting in the damage to another or by which an undue and unconscionable advantage is taken of another.[26] It cannot be over-emphasized that fraud is a question of fact which cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear and convincing evidence by the party alleging fraud.[27] Ei incumbit probation qui dicit, non que negat, otherwise stated, "he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove."[28] | |||||
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2012-03-21 |
SERENO, J. |
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| We held in Petron v. CIR (Petron),[53] which is on all fours with the instant case, that TCCs are valid and effective from their issuance and are not subject to a post-audit as a suspensive condition for their validity. Our ruling in Petron finds guidance from our earlier ruling in Shell, which categorically states that a TCC is valid and effective upon its issuance and is not subject to a post-audit. The implication on the instant case of the said earlier ruling is that Petron has the right to rely on the validity and effectivity of the TCCs that were assigned to it. In finally determining their effectivity in the settlement of respondent's excise tax liabilities, the validity of those TCCs should not depend on the results of the DOF's post-audit findings. We held thus in Petron: As correctly pointed out by Petron, however, the issue about the immediate validity of TCCs and the use thereof in payment of tax liabilities and duties are not matters of first impression for this Court. Taking into consideration the definition and nature of tax credits and TCCs, this Court's Second Division definitively ruled in the aforesaid Pilipinas Shell case that the post audit is not a suspensive condition for the validity of TCCs, thus: | |||||