This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2016-01-12 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| In a Resolution[15] dated 3 August 2011, the members of the Special Third Division referred the case to the Court En Banc. On 16 August 2011, the Court En Banc resolved to accept the case.[16] The Court then issued a Resolution[17] requiring petitioners, the BSP and the DAR, which was represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), to file their respective Comments on the Motion for Reconsideration. | |||||
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2015-11-09 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| While a notarized document is presumed to be regular such presumption is not absolute and may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The fact that a document is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents.[50] | |||||
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2014-11-12 |
BRION, J. |
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| Public instruments are evidence of the facts that gave rise to their execution and are to be considered as containing all the terms of the agreement.[49] While a notarized document enjoys this presumption, "the fact that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents."[50] The presumption of regularity of notarized documents is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.[51] | |||||
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2012-11-27 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| The rule then is that the party who stands to profit from a declaration of the nullity of a contract on the ground of insufficiency of consideration which would necessarily refer to one who asserts such nullity has the burden of overthrowing the presumption offered by the aforequoted Section 3(r). Obviously then, the presumption contextually operates in favor of Cojuangco and against the Republic, as plaintiff a quo, which then had the burden to prove that indeed there was no sufficient consideration for the Second Agreement. The Sandiganbayan's stated observation, therefore, that based on the wordings of the Second Agreement, Cojuangco had no personal and exclusive option to purchase the FUB shares from Pedro Cojuangco had really little to commend itself for acceptance. This, as opposed to the fact that such sale and purchase agreement is memorialized in a notarized document whereby both Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Pedro Cojuangco attested to the correctness of the provisions thereof, among which was that Eduardo had such option to purchase. A notarized document, Lazaro v. Agustin[47] teaches, "generally carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the disputable presumption of regularity." | |||||
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2011-11-28 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Petitioner likewise argues that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to appreciate that the notarized deed of pacto de retro sale was entitled to the presumption of regularity and should be given great weight. It is settled that while a notarized document enjoys this presumption, "the fact that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents."[26] The "presumption of regularity of notarized documents is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary."[27] | |||||
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2011-06-15 |
SERENO, J. |
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| The reclassification/conversion of the land has long been a foregone fact. While respondents insist that the process by which the land was reclassified was invalid, their claim is immaterial, because, as stated, the two procedures are distinct. Independently of the Sangguniang Bayan's own initiative, the DAR issued a Certificate of Eligibility. These issuances only bolster the fact that, at the time it was converted, the land was no longer agricultural, and that it would generate more revenue if reclassified as a residential area. Resolution No. ML-08-S-96, adopted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Silang, recommended conversion based on the favorable findings of the Committee on Housing and Land Use. The Resolution states: [43] | |||||