This case has been cited 1 times or more.
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2013-03-20 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Viewed in the light of the foregoing considerations, petitioners' reliance on Sections 40[59] and 41[60] of Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure is, at the very least, misplaced. Inasmuch as possession must be adverse, public, peaceful and uninterrupted in order to consolidate prescription, it stands to reason that acts of a possessory character done by virtue of a license or mere tolerance on the part of the real owner are not sufficient.[61] It has been ruled that this principle is applicable not only with respect to the prescription of the dominium as a whole, but, to the prescription of right in rem.[62] Considering that Article 1119 of the present Civil Code also provides that "(a)cts of possessory character executed in virtue of license or by mere tolerance of the owner shall not be available for the purposes of possession," the error petitioners impute against the CA for applying the new Civil Code provisions on prescription is more apparent than real. Then as now, possession must be en concepto de dueƱo or adverse in order to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right. If not, such possessory acts, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of prescription.[63] | |||||