This case has been cited 3 times or more.
|
2013-11-20 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
| It is well-settled that land of the public domain is not ipso facto converted into a patrimonial or private property by the mere possession and occupation by an individual over a long period of time. In the case of Diaz v. Republic,[72] it was written: But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before it was established as a military reservation, there was nevertheless still a dearth of evidence with respect to its occupation by petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest for more than 30 years. x x x. | |||||
|
2013-11-20 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
| Another recent case, Diaz v. Republic,[75] also held that possession even for more than 30 years cannot ripen into ownership.[76] Possession is of no moment if applicants fail to sufficiently and satisfactorily show that the subject lands over which an application was applied for was indeed an alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. It would not matter even if they declared it for tax purposes. In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio,[77] the rule was reiterated. Thus: Well-entrenched is the rule that unless a land is reclassified and declared alienable and disposable, occupation in the concept of an owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. Consequently, respondents could not have occupied the Lot in the concept of an owner in 1947 and subsequent years when respondents declared the Lot for taxation purposes, or even earlier when respondents' predecessors-in-interest possessed the Lot, because the Lot was considered inalienable from the time of its declaration as a military reservation in 1904. Therefore, respondents failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Lot is alienable and disposable. Public lands not shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable land remain part of the inalienable public domain. In view of the lack of sufficient evidence showing that the Lot was already classified as alienable and disposable, the Lot applied for by respondents is inalienable land of the public domain, not subject to registration under Section 14(1) of PD 1529 and Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended by PD 1073. Hence, there is no need to discuss the other requisites dealing with respondents' occupation and possession of the Lot in the concept of an owner. While it is an acknowledged policy of the State to promote the distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and in line with the ideal of social justice, the law imposes stringent safeguards upon the grant of such resources lest they fall into the wrong hands to the prejudice of the national patrimony. We must not, therefore, relax the stringent safeguards relative to the registration of imperfect titles. [Emphases Supplied] | |||||
|
2011-09-21 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
||||
| The imposition of treble costs of suit on the petitioners is meant to remind them and their attorney that the extent that an attorney's exercise of his professional responsibility for their benefit as his clients submits to reasonable limits beyond which he ought to go no further, and that his failure to recognize such limits will not be allowed to go unsanctioned by the Court. Thus, the Court has not hesitated to impose treble costs of suit (a) to stress its dislike for "any scheme to prolong litigation" or for "an unwarranted effort to avoid the implementation of a judgment painstakingly arrived at;"[18] (b) to sanction an appeal that was obviously interposed "for the sole purpose of delay;"[19] (c) to disapprove of the party's "lack of good and honest intentions, as well as the evasive manner by which it was able to frustrate (the adverse party's) claim for a decade;"[20] (d) to stifle a party's deplorable propensity to "go to extreme lengths to evade complying with their duties under the law and the orders of this Court" and thereby to cause the case to drag "for far too long with practically no end in sight;"[21] (e) to condemn the counsel's frantic search for "any ground to resuscitate his client's lost cause;"[22] and (f) to reiterate that a litigant, although his right to initiate an action in court is fully respected, is not permitted to initiate similar suits once his case has been adjudicated by a competent court in a valid final judgment, in the hope of securing a favorable ruling "for this will result to endless litigations detrimental to the administration of justice."[23] | |||||