This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2011-06-02 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| illusory. Such reasons must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment.[7] We note that the reason of the trial court in granting execution pending appeal was to prevent the irreparable collapse of petitioner's business operation and that private respondent's appeal is patently unmeritorious and would only result in the delay of the final | |||||
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2006-06-30 |
TINGA, J. |
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| To rule that a special civil action for certiorari constitutes the sole and exclusive remedy to assail a writ or order of execution would unduly restrict the remedy available to a party prejudiced by an improper or illegal execution. A special civil action for certiorari is not a mode of appeal where the appellate court reviews the errors of fact or law committed by the lower court. The issue in a special civil action for certiorari is whether the lower court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.[18] | |||||
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2005-01-28 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| On the other hand, Section 1(f) of Rule 41[22] of the Rules unequivocally states that no appeal may be taken from an order of execution. Rule 41 adds that in instances in which an order is not appealable, the aggrieved party's recourse is a special civil action under Rule 65. Hence, an order of execution, when issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may be the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.[23] | |||||
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2000-10-18 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| illusory. Such reasons must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment.[7] We note that the reason of the trial court in granting execution pending appeal was to prevent the irreparable collapse of petitioner's business operation and that private respondent's appeal is patently unmeritorious and would only result in the delay of the final | |||||
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2000-08-16 |
PARDO, J. |
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| appeal restoring respondent in possession of the leased premises and worst, appointed a special sheriff to carry out the writ of execution. In the first place, we emphatically rule that the Court of Appeals has no authority to issue immediate execution pending appeal of its own decision. Discretionary execution under Rule 39, Section 2 (a), 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is allowed pending appeal of a judgment or final order of the trial court, upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing. A judgment of the Court of Appeals cannot be executed pending appeal. Once final and executory, the judgment must be remanded to the lower court, where a motion for its execution may be filed only after its entry.[66] In other words, before its finality, the judgment cannot be executed. There can be no discretionary execution of a decision of the Court of Appeals. In the second place, even in discretionary executions, the same must be firmly founded upon good reasons. The court must state in a special order the "good reasons" justifying the issuance of the writ.[67] The good reasons allowing execution pending appeal must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the injuries or damages to the adverse party if the decision is reversed.[68] Jurisprudence teaches us what are "good reasons" that justify a premature execution of judgment, such as "deterioration of commodities subject of litigation"[69] and "the deteriorating condition of the vessel, M/V 'Valiant' . . . left to rot at the pier and without a crew to guard it".[70] In this case, the good reasons given by the Court of Appeals to support the discretionary execution of its decision are (1) that respondent would be deprived of income from its business endeavors; (2) that "it is of public knowledge" that the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court are clogged with cases and it may take some time before the decision in the case may attain its finality; and (3) that petitioners acted with bad faith and malice.[71] None of the cited reasons is "good" enough. According to jurisprudence, respondent's precarious financial condition is not a compelling circumstance warranting immediate execution.[72] The assertion that "it is of public knowledge" that the Supreme Court is clogged with cases that may take time to decide mocks the integrity and derides the competence of this Court. The remark erodes and undermines the people's trust and confidence in the judiciary, ironically coming from one of its subordinate courts. This is an assault on the Supreme Court that borders on contempt; we cannot permit such attack to pass without sanction. This we cannot countenance. Litigants, lawyers and judges share the responsibility of unclogging the dockets of the judiciary.[73] No lower court justice or judge may deride, chastise or chide the Supreme Court even speaking "with due respect" in his ponencia. In fact, it is the duty of lower courts to obey the decisions of the Supreme Court and render obeisance to its status as the apex of the hierarchy of courts. "A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation."[74] "There is only one Supreme Court from whose decision all other courts should take their bearings" so spoke Justice J. B. L. Reyes.[75] We echo this golden nugget of advice. If a judge of a lower court cannot do so in conscience, he has no alternative but to yield his judicial robe and resign.[76] More, it has been held that urgency resulting from years of delay in the disposal of a case is not a good reason for premature execution of the decision.[77] Bad faith and malice are not indicated simply because petitioners insisted on their rights and exhausted judicial remedies. On the contrary, good faith is always presumed.[78] In the third place, on September 14, 1998, petitioners elevated the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court by petition for review.[79] By the mere fact of the filing of the petition, the finality of the Court of Appeals' decision was stayed, and there could be no entry of judgment therein,[80] and, hence, no premature execution could be had. The Court of Appeals adopted its resolution granting execution pending appeal on September 18, 1998, after the petition for review was already filed in the Supreme Court.[81] It thereby encroached on the hallowed grounds of the Supreme Court. Worst of all, the Court of Appeals has no authority to appoint a special sheriff.[82] It appointed an employee of the mailing section, who was not even bonded as required by law.[83] Such display of keen interest in the immediate execution of its decision coupled with the exercise of excessive authority by illegally appointing a "special sheriff' makes the concerned members of the Court of Appeals liable to disciplinary action and the imposition of appropriate penalty.[84] WHEREFORE, the Court declares VOID the resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 18, 1998 in CA-G. R. SP No. 47158 and SP No. 47720, and the writ of execution dated September 21, 1998, issued pursuant thereto. Petitioners are acquitted of the charge | |||||