This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2013-07-08 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| It is, on the other hand, doctrinal that abandonment is a matter of intention[32] and cannot, for said reason, be lightly inferred, much less legally presumed from certain equivocal acts.[33] Viewed in the light of Escudero's persistence in reporting for work despite the irregular payment of her salaries starting July 2003, we find that her subsequent failure to do so as a consequence of Tan Brothers' non-payment of her salaries in May 2004 is hardly evincive of an intention to abandon her employment. Indeed, mere absence or failure to report for work, even after a notice to return work has been served, is not enough to amount to an abandonment of employment.[34] Considering that a notice directing Escudero to return to work was not even issued in the premises, we find that the CA committed no reversible error in ruling out Tan Brother's defense of abandonment. | |||||
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2013-06-19 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| There is no showing of respondent's intent to sever the employer-employee relationship. It is also notable that when respondent was refused entry to petitioners' premises and the letter of former's counsel was refused acceptance by the latter, there is already constructive dismissal which led respondent to seek recourse by filing an illegal dismissal case against petitioners on May 30, 2001. The proximity of respondent's filing of the complaint from the time he received the telegram and was refused entry to petitioners' premises showed that he had the least intention of abandoning his job. Well-settled that the filing by an employee of a complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement is proof enough of his desire to return to work, thus, negating the employer's charge of abandonment.[37] As correctly held by the CA: Besides, respondent Cabusas immediately filed on 30 May 2001 a complaint for illegal dismissal. An employee who forthwith takes steps to protest his layoff cannot by any stretch of imagination be said to have abandoned his work and the filing of the complaint is proof enough of his desire to return to work, thus negating any suggestion of abandonment. The Supreme Court pronounced in the case of Judric Canning Corporation v. Inciong, that "it would be illogical for the respondent to abandon his work and then immediately file an action seeking his reinstatement." Verily, Cabusas' act of contesting the legality of his dismissal ably supports his sincere intention to return to work, thus negating the stand of petitioner that he had abandoned his job.[38] | |||||
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2011-11-16 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Being a matter of intention, moreover, abandonment cannot be inferred or presumed from equivocal acts.[26] As a just and valid ground for dismissal, it requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment,[27] without any intention of returning.[28] Two elements must concur: (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts.[29] The burden of proving abandonment is once again upon the employer[30] who, whether pleading the same as a ground for dismissing an employee or as a mere defense, additionally has the legal duty to observe due process.[31] Settled is the rule that mere absence or failure to report to work is not tantamount to abandonment of work.[32] | |||||
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2008-07-28 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| A diminution of pay is prejudicial to the employee and amounts to constructive dismissal.[35] The gauge for constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would feel compelled to give up his employment under the prevailing circumstances. Constructive dismissal is defined as quitting when continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely as the offer of employment involves a demotion in rank or diminution in pay.[36] It exists when the resignation on the part of the employee was involuntary due to the harsh, hostile and unfavorable conditions set by the employer. It is brought about by the clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain shown by an employer which becomes unbearable to the employee. An employee who is forced to surrender his position through the employer's unfair or unreasonable acts is deemed to have been illegally terminated and such termination is deemed to be involuntary.[37] | |||||
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2007-08-24 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| On the matter of service, Section 1, Rule 65 in relation to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, clearly states that in a petition filed originally in the Court of Appeals, the petitioner is required to serve a copy of the petition on the adverse party before its filing.[18] If the adverse party appears by counsel, service shall be made on such counsel pursuant to Section 2, Rule 13. Since the OSG represents the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals, then service of the petition should be made on that office.[19] | |||||
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2007-01-30 |
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| Aside from failing to prove abandonment, we also agree that petitioner failed to serve respondent the required written notices (1) containing the charge of abandonment to afford respondent the opportunity to be heard and defend herself, and (2) stating petitioner's decision to terminate respondent with clear reasons therefor.[33] | |||||
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2006-10-16 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Moreover, we perceive a patent error in the mode of appeal elected by petitioner for the purpose of assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.[19] Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefore is grave abuse of discretion.[20] In the case at bar, the proper remedy of petitioner VRESCO to dispute the Decision of the appellate court is to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which should be instituted within 15 days from receipt of the assailed decision or resolution.[21] In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently emphasized that after the lapse of the 15-day period to file a petition for Review on Certiorari, the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is not, and cannot be, a substitute for a lost remedy of appeal.[22] In the case at bar, the petition was filed 45 days after receipt of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying its Motion for Reconsideration, evidently beyond the 15-day period for filing a petition for review on certiorari, hence the period to appeal was lost. Therefore, the instant petition cannot prevail since a petition for certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal, specially if one's error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.[23] | |||||
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2006-09-12 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an employee who is unjustly dismissed is entitled to reinstatement, without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and to the payment of his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time his compensation was withheld up to the time of his actual reinstatement.[36] | |||||
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2006-07-12 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| To effectuate a valid dismissal from employment by the employer, the Labor Code has set twin requirements, namely: (1) the dismissal must be for any of the causes provided in Article 282[34] of the Labor Code; and (2) the employee must be given an opportunity to be heard and defend himself.[35] The first requisite is referred to as the substantive aspect, while the second is deemed as the procedural aspect. | |||||