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ALFREDO ARQUELADA v. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK

This case has been cited 11 times or more.

2012-06-27
BRION, J.
Since the rent was paid on a monthly basis, the period of lease is considered to be from month to month, in accordance with Article 1687 of the Civil Code. "[A] lease from month to month is considered to be one with a definite period which expires at the end of each month upon a demand to vacate by the lessor."[21] When the respondent sent a notice to vacate to the petitioner on August 5, 1998, the tacita reconduccion was aborted, and the contract is deemed to have expired at the end of that month. "[A] notice to vacate constitutes an express act on the part of the lessor that it no longer consents to the continued occupation by the lessee of its property."[22] After such notice, the lessee's right to continue in possession ceases and her possession becomes one of detainer.[23]
2010-08-25
BRION, J.
Thus, as further clarified, an extrajudicial rescission gave rise to the demand to vacate that, upon being refused, rendered the possession illegal and laid the lessee open to ejectment.  The rescission, an extrajudicial one, was triggered by the lessee's refusal to pay the rent or to comply with the terms of the lease.  The Court put it in plainer terms in Arquelada v. Philippine Veterans Bank:[17] where it said: As contemplated in Section 2, the demand required is the demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and not merely a demand to vacate. Consequently, both demands - either to pay rent or adhere to the terms of the lease and vacate are necessary to make the lessee a deforciant in order that an ejectment suit may be filed. It is the lessor's demand for the lessee to vacate the premises and the tenant's refusal to do so which makes unlawful the withholding of the possession. Such refusal violates the lessor's right of possession giving rise to an action for unlawful detainer. However, prior to the institution of such action, a demand from the lessor to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate the premises is required under the aforequoted rule. Thus, mere failure to pay the rents due or violation of the terms of the lease does not automatically render a person's possession unlawful. Furthermore, the giving of such demands must be alleged in the complaint, otherwise the MTC cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case. [Emphasis supplied.]
2009-09-30
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
A lease on a month-to-month basis provides for a definite period and may be terminated at the end of any month, hence, by the failure of the lessees to pay the rents due for a particular month, the lease contract is deemed terminated as of the end of that month.[15] Applying this principle, the lease contract in the instant case was deemed terminated at the end of the month when the petitioner, as lessee, failed to pay the rents due.
2007-06-19
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Both demands to pay installment due or adhere to the terms of the Contract to Sell and to vacate are necessary to make the vendee deforciant in order that an ejectment suit may be filed.[32] It is the vendor's demand for the vendee to vacate the premises and the vendee's refusal to do so which makes unlawful the withholding of the possession.[33] Such refusal violates the vendor's right of possession giving rise to an action for unlawful detainer.[34] However, prior to the institution of such action, a demand from the vendor to pay the installment due or comply with the conditions of the Contract to Sell and to vacate the premises is required under the aforequoted rule.
2007-06-19
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Both demands to pay installment due or adhere to the terms of the Contract to Sell and to vacate are necessary to make the vendee deforciant in order that an ejectment suit may be filed.[32] It is the vendor's demand for the vendee to vacate the premises and the vendee's refusal to do so which makes unlawful the withholding of the possession.[33] Such refusal violates the vendor's right of possession giving rise to an action for unlawful detainer.[34] However, prior to the institution of such action, a demand from the vendor to pay the installment due or comply with the conditions of the Contract to Sell and to vacate the premises is required under the aforequoted rule.
2006-02-27
CALLEJO, SR., J.
As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer be updated in the latest laws and jurisprudence.[10] Indeed, when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[11] As a retired judge, respondent should have known that it is his duty to keep himself well-informed of the latest rulings of the Court on the issues and legal problems confronting a client.[12] In this case, the law he apparently misconstrued is no less than the Constitution,[13] the most basic law of the land.[14] Implicit in a lawyer's mandate to protect a client's interest to the best of his/her ability and with utmost diligence is the duty to keep abreast of the law and legal developments, and participate in continuing legal education programs.[15] Thus, in championing the interest of clients and defending cases, a lawyer must not only be guided by the strict standards imposed by the lawyer's oath, but should likewise espouse legally sound arguments for clients, lest the latter's cause be dismissed on a technical ground.[16] Ignorance encompasses both substantive and procedural laws.[17]
2004-05-27
QUISUMBING, J.
Petitioners' reliance on Gallarde v. Moran,[15] Murga v. Chan,[16] and on Section 2, Rule 70, does not help their cause. An examination of Section 2, Rule 70, readily shows that the rule is applicable only where there is a lessor-lessee relationship under a lease contract, which does not exist in this case. Further, the rule applies only in instances where the grounds relied upon for ejectment are non-payment of rentals or violation of the conditions of the lease, as the case may be. In those cited situations, notice to vacate is crucial.[17] A demand is a pre-requisite to an action for unlawful detainer, when the action is based on "failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of his lease," but not where the action is to terminate the lease because of the expiration of its term.[18]
2001-10-25
PARDO, J.
Section 5 (f) applies in case of expiration of the period of the lease contract, whether written or verbal.[10]1 Here, the lease agreement between petitioners and the Sandikos did not fix the period of the lease, but provided that rentals were paid yearly. This was a lease for a definite period and expired at the end of each year.[11] The lease was not renewed.  Consequently, the prohibition in Batas Pambansa Blg. 877 to eject the lessee on the ground that the leased premises has been sold or mortgaged to a third person does not apply.
2001-10-17
KAPUNAN, J.
Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals but these were denied for lack of merit.[12]
2001-06-20
DE LEON, JR., J.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the lease was verbal, that the rentals were paid monthly, and that proper demand and notice by the lessor to vacate was given.  Under existing jurisprudence, a verbal contract of lease between owner and lessee on a month-to-month basis is a lease with definite period and such expires after the last day of any given thirty-day period, upon proper demand and notice by the lessor to vacate.[19] Thus, the appellate court should not have extended the period of lease considering that the potestative authority of the courts to fix a longer term for a lease under Article 1687 of the Civil Code applies only to cases where there is no period fixed by the parties.[20]
2001-04-19
BELLOSILLO, J.
On the strength of this provision of Rule 70, respondent Chua as vendor was without doubt authorized to institute the action for ejectment. Moreover, inasmuch as the rule recognizes such right of the vendor, respondent Chua also had the right to send the notices of termination of the lease agreement and to vacate on 4 December 1995 and 28 March 1996.  The right to send the notices is rooted in the right to file the court action.  At any rate, petitioner need not have harped on the alleged absence of the right of respondent Chua to send the notices. The notice or demand to vacate is not necessary when the unlawful detainer is based on expiration of the contract of lease,[16] as what obtains here.