This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2004-02-05 |
DAVIDE JR., CJ. |
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| Apparently, the trial court and the prosecution unduly relied on Besonia's plea of guilty and his admissions made during the searching inquiry. The prosecution did not discharge its obligation as seriously as it would have had there been no plea of guilt on the part of Besonia.[28] Its presentation of its case was lacking in assiduity that is necessarily expected in a prosecution for a capital offense; it was too meager to be accepted as being the standard constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit a human life.[29] It has been held that where the plea of guilt to a capital offense has adversely influenced or impaired the presentation of the prosecution's case, the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings is imperative.[30] | |||||
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2001-12-14 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| It is also urged in the Brief for the Appellant that an improvident plea of guilty per se results in the remand of the criminal case(s) to the trial court for the re-arraignment of accused-appellant and for further proceedings. We hold that this argument does not accurately reflect the standing principle. Our jurisdiction does not subscribe to a per se rule that once a plea of guilty is deemed improvidently made that the accused-appellant is at once entitled to a remand. To warrant a remand of the criminal case, it must also be proved that as a result of such irregularity there was inadequate representation of facts by either the prosecution or the defense during the trial. In People v. Abapo[31] we found that undue reliance upon an invalid plea of guilty prevented the prosecution from fully presenting its evidence, and thus remanded the criminal case for further proceedings. Similarly in People v. Durango[32] where an improvident plea of guilty was followed by an abbreviated proceeding with practically no role at all being played by the defense, we ruled that this procedure was "just too meager to accept as being the standard constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit a human life" and so threw back the criminal case to the trial court for appropriate action. Verily the relevant matter that justifies the remand of the criminal case to the trial court is the procedural unfairness or complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the proceedings a quo as occasioned by the improvident plea of guilty,[33] or what People v. Tizon[34] encapsulizes as the "attendant circumstances." | |||||
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2001-03-20 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| As the proceedings in the court a quo failed to observe the exacting standards of constitutional due process, we have no other choice but to remand the case to the court a quo for further and appropriate proceedings conformably with what we have heretofore expressed. The other assigned errors committed by the court a quo will no longer be addressed because of the order of remand. During the remand proceedings, the trial court, the prosecutors and the defense counsel would be well-advised to read and observe this Court's pronouncements in, among others, People v. Bello,[21] People v. Tizon,[22] People v. Nadera Jr.,[23] People v. Abapo,[24] aside from People v. Durango[25] and People v. Bermas.[26] | |||||
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2001-03-20 |
GONZAGA-REYES, J. |
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| Yes, Your Honor, I admit.[7] Nowhere in the proceedings was it explained to the accused that the penalty imposable is death even if he pleads guilty. We are inclined to agree with the accused-appellant that had he been so informed, he would not have changed his plea and voluntarily accept the imposition of a death penalty. This Court has held[8] that it is mandatory for the trial court to accomplish three things to avoid an improvident plea of guilt, namely: 1) conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the accused's plea; 2) require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise decree of his culpability and 3) inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. It is not enough to inquire as to the voluntariness of the plea; the court must explain fully to the accused that once convicted, he could be meted the death penalty. Death is a single and indivisible penalty and will be imposed regardless of the presence of a mitigating circumstance.[9] The importance of the court's obligation cannot be overemphasized for one cannot dispel the possibility that the accused may have been led to believe that due to his voluntary plea of guilt, he may be imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and not death[10] | |||||
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2000-12-18 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Inasmuch as both PAJO and LIQUIGAN have taken no appeal with respect to these cases, they became final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days, the period for perfecting an appeal.[13] On the other hand, Criminal Cases Nos. 97-233, 97-664 and 97-665 are now before this Court on automatic review in view of the imposition of the death penalty. It is only in cases where the accused is sentenced to death when the appeal of the decision to the Supreme Court is automatic.[14] We thus limit our discussion to Criminal Cases Nos. 97-233, 97-664 and 97- 665 where the death penalty was imposed on PAJO. | |||||