This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2011-10-19 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| No matter how honest Amegable's testimony might have been, her identification of Caliso by a sheer look at his back for a few minutes could not be regarded as positive enough to generate that moral certainty about Caliso being the perpetrator of the killing, absent other reliable circumstances showing him to be AAA's killer. Her identification of him in that manner lacked the qualities of exclusivity and uniqueness, even as it did not rule out her being mistaken. Indeed, there could be so many other individuals in the community where the crime was committed whose backs might have looked like Caliso's back. Moreover, many factors could have influenced her perception, including her lack of keenness of observation, her emotional stress of the moment, her proneness to suggestion from others, her excitement, and her tendency to assume. The extent of such factors are not part of the records; hence, the trial court and the CA could not have taken them into consideration. But the influence of such varied factors could not simply be ignored or taken for granted, for it is even a well-known phenomenon that the members of the same family, whose familiarity with one another could be easily granted, often inaccurately identify one another through a sheer view of another's back. Certainly, an identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any evidentiary force.[23] | |||||
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2011-04-04 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for, even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of the identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.[22] In that regard, an identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any evidentiary force.[23] The intervention of any mistake or the appearance of any weakness in the identification simply means that the accused's constitutional right of presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved is not overcome, thereby warranting an acquittal,[24] even if doubt may cloud his innocence.[25] Indeed, the presumption of innocence constitutionally guaranteed to every individual is forever of primary importance, and every conviction for crime must rest on the strength of the evidence of the State, not on the weakness of the defense.[26] | |||||
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2010-07-05 |
BRION, J. |
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| In flagrante delicto means "[i]n the very act of committing the crime."[22] To be caught in flagrante delicto, therefore, necessarily implies positive identification by an eyewitness or eyewitnesses to the act of tampering so that there is "direct evidence" of culpability, or "that which proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption."[23] | |||||
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2008-02-18 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| In flagrante delicto means "[i]n the very act of committing the crime." To be caught in flagrante delicto, therefore, necessarily implies positive identification by the eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such is a "direct evidence" of culpability, or "that which proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption."[15] | |||||
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2006-09-27 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| From the foregoing, the inevitable conclusion is that the guilt of petitioner Yadao has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The facts of the case, the autopsy reports, as well as the testimony of Dr. Llavore do not definitely establish that the assault was the proximate cause of the death of the victim. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the blow inflicted on the head of the victim resulted in an edematous condition of the brain, petitioner Yadao would still not be held liable for the death as the prosecution failed to present proof that said act was the efficient and proximate cause of the victim's demise. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the accused's innocence may be doubted.[50] It is better to free a guilty man than to unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has not been proved by the required quantum of evidence. For only when there is proof beyond any shadow of doubt that those responsible should be made answerable.[51] | |||||
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2005-08-29 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| To emphasize, the foundation of the ruling of acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means that the prosecution's evidence was not sufficient to sustain the guilt of the accused-petitioner beyond the point of moral certainty certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and the conscience of those who are to act upon it.[33] It is such proof to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to support it. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the accused's innocence may be doubted,[34] for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.[35] And, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction,[36] and, thus, that which is favorable to the accused should be considered.[37] | |||||
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2005-07-29 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| To emphasize, the foundation of the ruling of acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means that the prosecution's evidence was not sufficient to sustain the guilt of the accused-petitioner beyond the point of moral certainty - certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and the conscience of those who are to act upon it.[33] It is such proof to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to support it. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the accused's innocence may be doubted,[34] for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.[35] And, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction,[36] and, thus, that which is favorable to the accused should be considered.[37] | |||||
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2000-06-08 |
GONZAGA-REYES, J. |
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| Our ruling to acquit does not hold a corollary upholding of the credibility of the testimony of accused-appellant. The basis of the acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means that the evidence of the prosecution was not sufficient to sustain the guilt of accused-appellant beyond the point of moral certainty. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, however, is a burden particular to the prosecution and does not apply to exculpatory facts as may be raised by the defense; the accused is not required to establish matters in mitigation or defense beyond a reasonable doubt, nor is he required to establish the truth of such matters by a preponderance of the evidence, or even to a reasonable probability.[32] An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the accused's innocence may be doubted,[33] for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.[34] | |||||