This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2012-06-25 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| This brings us to whether the guilt of petitioners for homicide and frustrated homicide has been established beyond cavil of doubt. The precept in all criminal cases is that the prosecution is bound by the invariable requisite of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the evidence of the accused. The weakness of the defense of the accused does not relieve the prosecution of its responsibility of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[133] By reasonable doubt is meant that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.[134] The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains reasonable doubt as to his guilt.[135] | |||||
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2005-11-11 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The Office of the Solicitor General argues that Fukuzume himself alleged in his affidavit dated July 20, 1994 that in an unspecified date, he received P50,000.00 from Yu at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we cannot rely on this affidavit for the reason that it forms part of the records of the preliminary investigation and, therefore, may not be considered evidence. It is settled that the record of the preliminary investigation, whether conducted by a judge or a prosecutor, shall not form part of the record of the case in the RTC.[42] In People vs. Crispin,[43] this Court held that the fact that the affidavit formed part of the record of the preliminary investigation does not justify its being treated as evidence because the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case in the RTC. Such record must be introduced as evidence during trial, and the trial court is not compelled to take judicial notice of the same.[44] Since neither prosecution nor defense presented in evidence Fukuzume's affidavit, the same may not be considered part of the records, much less evidence. | |||||
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2001-01-05 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In this case, the trial court rejected Antonio's retraction of his affidavit dated May 22, 1992, for being contrary to human experience and inherently unworthy of belief. The trial court cited, by way of illustration, the portion of the affidavit where Antonio claimed that after he and Primo agreed to commit suicide and drinking a bottle of insecticide, Antonio wrote a farewell letter to his barangay-mates. We note, however, that Antonio's second affidavit should have been rejected together with the first affidavit. Unless an affiant himself takes the witness stand to affirm the averments in his affidavit, the affidavit must be excluded from the judicial proceeding for being inadmissible hearsay.[81] In this case the affiant expressly refused to confirm the contents of his first affidavit. Instead, he testified that said affidavit, Exhibit "E" was prepared under grave threats and severe pressure from Ermac and Viva.[82] His earlier affidavit's contents were hearsay, hence inadmissible in evidence. | |||||
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2000-11-20 |
PARDO, J. |
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| The rule is settled that conviction must rest on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. The identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Even though accused-appellants Wilfredo and Jaime invoke the inherently weak defense of alibi, such defense nonetheless acquires commensurate strength where they were not positively identified, as the prosecution still has the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused. The weakness of the defense does not relieve it of this responsibility.[18] | |||||