This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2015-01-21 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In the Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal[109] line of cases involving the issue of ineligibility based on the residency requirements, that Court declared that it must exercise utmost caution before disqualifying a winning candidate, shown to be the clear choice of the constituents to represent them in Congress. | |||||
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2013-03-19 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| Lest it be misunderstood, the HRET is not bound by previous COMELEC pronouncements relative to the qualifications of the Members of the House. Being the sole judge[57] of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its respective members, the HRET cannot be tied down by COMELEC resolutions, else its constitutional mandate[58] be circumvented and rendered nugatory. Instructive on this point is the Court's disquisition in Fernandez v. HRET,[59] to wit: Private respondent concludes from the above that petitioner had no legal basis to claim that the HRET, when reference to the qualification/s of Members of the House of Representatives is concerned, is "co-equal", to the COMELEC, such that the HRET cannot disregard any ruling of COMELEC respecting · the matter of eligibility and qualification of a member of the House of Representatives. The truth is the other way around, because the COMELEC is subservient to the HRET when the dispute or contest at issue refers to the eligibility and/or qualification of a Member of the House of Representatives. A petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET as sole judge, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if another body may have passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceeding the issue of the Member's qualification while the Member was still a candidate. There is forum-shopping only when two cases involve the same parties and the same cause of action. The two cases here are distinct and dissimilar in their nature and character. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) | |||||
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2013-02-26 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| Assuming that the claim of property ownership of petitioner is true, Fernandez v. COMELEC[43] has established that the ownership of a house or some other property does not establish domicile. This principle is especially true in this case as petitioner has failed to establish her bodily presence in the locality and her intent to stay there at least a year before the elections, to wit: To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office, which property requirement would be unconstitutional. | |||||
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2012-04-24 |
SERENO, J. |
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| It is true that property ownership is not among the qualifications required of candidates for local election.[56] Rather, it is a candidate's residence in a locality through actual residence in whatever capacity. Indeed, we sustained the COMELEC when it considered as evidence tending to establish a candidate's domicile of choice the mere lease (rather than ownership) of an apartment by a candidate in the same province where he ran for the position of governor.[57] In the more recent case of Mitra v. Commission on Elections,[58] we reversed the COMELEC ruling that a candidate's sparsely furnished, leased room on the mezzanine of a feedmill could not be considered as his residence for the purpose of complying with the residency requirement of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.[59] | |||||
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2012-04-24 |
SERENO, J. |
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| Moreover, even assuming the truth of the allegation in the Affidavits that petitioner was "rarely seen" in the area, this does not preclude the possibility of his residence therein. In Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,[71] we held that the averments of certain barangay health workers that they failed to see a particular candidate whenever they made rounds of the locality of which he was supposed to be a resident is of no moment. It is possible that the candidate was out of the house to attend to his own business at the time. The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement. | |||||
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2012-04-24 |
SERENO, J. |
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| While private respondent had adduced affidavits of two Pinagtong-ulan residents (that of Violeta Fernandez[89] and Rodrigo Macasaet)[90] attesting that petitioner could not be a resident of Pinagtong-ulan as he was "rarely seen" in the area, these affidavits were controverted by the Joint affidavit of twenty-one (21) Pinagtong-ulan residents who plainly accused the two of lying. Meanwhile, the affidavits of private respondent[91] and Eladio de Torres[92] stating that petitioner is not a resident of Lipa City because he has no work or family there is hardly worthy of credence since both are residents of Barangay Calamias, which is, and private respondent does not contest this, about 15 kilometers from Pinagtong-ulan. | |||||
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2010-07-02 |
BRION, J. |
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| Fourth, Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal[36] is not on all fours with the present case - Fernandez stemmed from a quo warranto case while the present case involves a petition to deny due course or cancel the COC. Likewise, Fernandez successfully proved that his transfer to Sta. Rosa City, Laguna several years prior to his candidacy was prompted by valid reasons, i.e., existence of his business in the area and the enrolment of his children at Sta. Rosa schools, thereby erasing doubts as to the bona fide nature of his transfer. In the present case, the COMELEC en banc found that Mitra admitted that his transfer to Aborlan in 2008 was prompted by his plans to run for governor in the 2010 national and local elections. The COMELEC en banc also noted that Fernandez involved an individual who had earned an overwhelming mandate from the electorate. The COMELEC en banc's ruling on Mitra's case, on the other hand, came before the 2010 elections; thus, the people had not then voted.[37] | |||||
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2010-07-02 |
BRION, J. |
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| Also, the First Division said that Mitra's witnesses' sworn statements appear to have been prepared by the same person, as they use similar wordings, allegations, and contents; thus, putting into question the credibility of the statements. Furthermore, the lease contract over the Maligaya Feedmill between Mitra and Carme Caspe is effective only up to February 28, 2010, thus casting doubt on Mitra's claim of residency in Aborlan.[31] | |||||