This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2004-07-07 |
TINGA, J, |
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| It must be noted that the Appellant's Brief adopted the findings of the trial court,[38] and did not contest the liability of the accused even for simple rape, proceeding directly as it did with the discussion of the propriety of the death penalty. This being a death penalty case, however, the records are open for review.[39] | |||||
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2004-02-18 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| The trial court did not err in disregarding the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. To benefit an accused, the following requisites must be proven, namely: (1) the offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Voluntary surrender presupposes repentance.[22] In People v. Viernes,[23] we held that going to the police station to clear one's name does not show any intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities. | |||||
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2003-11-04 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Had the charge for the May 8, 1998 incident been concocted, Jonalyn could just have tailored her account by, e. g., omitting that portion of her testimony regarding the presence of family members at the time of the incident and about the door being left ajar. Or she could have inputed some details that could render her account more in accordance with common experience, like appellant kissing her on parts of her body before having an intercourse. That she did not, thus making her tale appear improbable, reinforces her credibility. For that something improbable can happen is always possible.[29] As for appellant's alibi with respect to the second case, - that he was on the afternoon of June 1, 1998 with his son Jobert tilling the farm of a certain Cipriano San Felipe which was located some two hundred meters away from his house,[30] it is inherently weak and unreliable. For given that distance between the place where he was, and the scene of the crime,[31] it was not physically impossible for him to be at the latter. That neither his son nor farm owner San Felipe came forward to corroborate his alibi all the more renders his alibi weak. | |||||
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2003-04-29 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Under Rule 121, Section 1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,[24] a motion for reconsideration of a judgment of conviction may be filed by the accused, or initiated by the court, with the consent of the accused. Likewise, under Rule 120, Section 7,[25] a judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside only upon motion of the accused.[26] These provisions changed the previous rulings[27] of the Court to the effect that such modification may be made upon motion of the fiscal, provided the same is made before a judgment has become final or an appeal has been perfected.[28] The requisite consent of the accused to such motion for reconsideration or modification is intended to protect the latter from having to defend himself anew from more serious offenses or penalties which the prosecution or the court may have overlooked.[29] Accordingly, once the judgment has been validly promulgated, any reconsideration or amendment to correct a manifest substantial error, even if unwittingly committed by the trial court through oversight or an initially erroneous comprehension, can be made only with the consent or upon the instance of the accused. Errors in the decision cannot be corrected unless the accused consents thereto, or himself moves for reconsideration of, or appeals from, the decision.[30] | |||||
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2003-01-20 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Anent the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the Court of Appeals erred in appreciating the same in favor of the petitioner. To benefit an accused, the following requisites must be proven, namely: (1) the offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture.[29] Voluntary surrender presupposes repentance.[30] In People v. Viernes,[31] we held that going to the police station to clear one's name does not show any intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities. | |||||