This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2007-07-24 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
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| On the other hand, petitioner offers alibi and denial as his defense. It is a settled doctrine that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was at some other place when the crime was committed; but the defense must likewise demonstrate that the accused could not have been physically present at the place of the crime, or in its immediate vicinity, during its commission.[23] In considering the physical distance of the accused from the crime scene, the Court has rejected alibi where the two places are in the same municipality,[24] where they are easily accessible by any mode of public transportation,[25] where the distance can be covered by walking for thirty minutes or by riding a vehicle for twenty minutes,[26] or even when it could be reached after approximately an hour.[27] | |||||
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2004-01-16 |
TINGA, J, |
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| The defense of alibi may not be successfully invoked where the identity of the assailant has been established by witnesses.[40] | |||||
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2002-12-17 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| somewhere else when the crime occurred. He must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.[14] Similarly, a denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and should not be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.[15] In the case at bar, accused-appellant alleged that at the time of the commission of the crime, he was in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija and left for Manila only on January 4, 1994. His alibi cannot overcome his positive identification by prosecution witnesses Teresita Castillo and | |||||
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2002-05-29 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Anent accused-appellant's civil liability for the crime of murder, the amount of P58,500.00 as actual damages awarded by the trial court should be deleted for failure of the prosecution to produce receipts in support thereof. However, in lieu thereof, temperate damages under Article 2224 of the Civil Code may be recovered, as it has been shown that the deceased's family suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty. For this reason, an award of P15,000.00 by way of temperate damages should suffice.[29] In line with recent jurisprudence, the heirs of the deceased should be awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages.[30] The exemplary damages and attorney's fees awarded by the court a quo should be deleted for lack of basis. | |||||
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2002-05-29 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi must be established by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused-appellant to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely that he was somewhere else.[28] Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the accused-appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places. It must be demonstrated that the accused-appellant was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.[29] | |||||
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2002-05-29 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| As for accused-appellant's civil liability, he should, in addition to the P50,000.00 civil indemnity and the costs, further pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages in line with recent jurisprudence.[32] | |||||
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2002-05-07 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The contentions are without merit. As testified to by the prosecution eyewitness, he did not notice a quarrel prior to the stabbing incident, and it was only upon reaching the topmost portion of the hill that he saw accused-appellant attacking the victim. The witness could not have been warned as he was unsuspectingly climbing on one side of the hill, unaware of the events unfolding on the other side thereof. Hence, he could not be reasonably expected to avoid the scene as claimed by accused-appellant. At any rate, the settled rule is that witnessing a crime is an unusual experience that elicits different reactions from witnesses for which no clear-cut standard of behavior can be drawn. Different people react differently to a given situation. There is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.[13] | |||||
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2002-04-03 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| Accused-appellant insists that the court a quo erred in ignoring his alibi. We sustain the trial court. For alibi to prosper, it must be established by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely that the accused was somewhere else. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime happened and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two (2) places.[6] | |||||
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2002-04-01 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be established by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely that the accused was somewhere else. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime happened and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of the access between the two places.[19] In the case at bar, accused-appellants failed to prove the element of physical impossibility. | |||||