This case has been cited 5 times or more.
|
2007-08-10 |
GARCIA, J. |
||||
| Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the right to bail may justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is great.[14] Here, ever since the promulgation of the assailed Resolutions a little more than four (4) years ago, Jinggoy does not, as determined by Sandiganbayan, seem to be a flight risk. We quote with approval what the graft court wrote in this regard:It is not open to serious doubt that the movant [Jinggoy] has, in general, been consistently respectful of the Court and its processes. He has not ominously shown, by word or by deed, that he is of such a flight risk that would necessitate his continued incarceration. Bearing in mind his conduct, social standing and his other personal circumstances, the possibility of his escape in this case seems remote if not nil.[15] | |||||
|
2003-10-16 |
PER CURIAM |
||||
| As to damages, while the trial court awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, it failed to grant civil indemnity which is mandatory upon a finding of rape. Civil indemnity is distinct from and should not be denominated as moral damages, which is based on different jural foundations. Indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P50,000.00 is automatically given to the offended party without need of further evidence other than the fact of rape.[41] In line with recent jurisprudence, an award of P75,000.00 is proper when rape is in its qualified form.[42] We affirm the award of moral damages which is also given without need of proof other than the commission of rape but should be increased to P75,000.00.[43] We likewise affirm the award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages because of the duly established circumstance of relationship[44] and to deter fathers with pervert tendencies and aberrant sexual behavior from preying upon their young daughters.[45] | |||||
|
2003-01-13 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| The Office of the Solicitor General counters that findings of the trial court during the bail hearing were but a preliminary appraisal of the strength of the prosecution's evidence for the limited purpose of determining whether appellant is entitled to be released on bail during the pendency of the trial.[25] Hence, we agree with the OSG that said findings should not be construed as an immutable evaluation of the prosecution's evidence. It is settled that the assessment of the prosecution evidence presented during bail hearings in capital offenses is preliminary and intended only for the purpose of granting or denying applications for the provisional release of the accused.[26] | |||||
|
2002-09-17 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| recent jurisprudence of P75,000 as indemnification for a rape victim is applicable only if the rape is committed under any of the circumstances in which the death penalty is prescribed by the applicable laws.[40] In simple rape, P50,000 is properly awarded as civil indemnity ex delicto. But another P50,000 should be awarded to the victim as moral damages, without need of further proof, because it is recognized that her injury is concomitant with and necessarily the result of the odious crime.[41] WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114, in Criminal Case No. 96-9500, finding appellant NEXIEL ORTEGA alias "Rex Ortega" GUILTY of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is | |||||
|
2002-05-29 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| [F]ailure to object was thus a waiver of the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. It is competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and to consent to action which would be invalid if taken against his will. (1 ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 31-32 [1983 ed.]). This Court has, on more than one occasion, recognized waivers of constitutional rights, e.g., the right against unreasonable searches and seizures (People v. Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221 [1936]; Viuda de Gracia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689 [1938]); the right to counsel and to remain silent (People v. Royo, 114 SCRA 304 [1982]); the right to be heard (Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 [1949]; People v. Dichoso, 96 SCRA 957 [1980]); and the right to bail (People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 [1991]). On the second issue, accused-appellant questions the trial court's assessment of private complainant's testimony. Accused-appellant makes much of the finding of the investigating judge during the bail hearing that the evidence against accused-appellant was not strong. It must be stressed, however, that the assessment of the evidence presented during a bail hearing is intended only for the purpose of granting or denying an application for the provisional release of the accused. Not being a final assessment, and merely for the purpose of determining the necessity of confinement to avoid escape, courts tend to be fair and liberal in their appreciation of evidence. Thus in People v. Baldoz, et al.,[14] the Court made the following pronouncements:"…The assessment of the evidence presented during a bail hearing is intended only for the purpose of granting or denying an application for the provisional release of the accused. It is not a final assessment. Before conviction, every one accused is entitled to bail, except when the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death; and the evidence of guilt is strong. Needless to say, everyone enjoys the presumption of innocence. | |||||