This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2015-01-21 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Ang Tibay enumerated the constitutional requirements of due process, which Ang Tibay described as the "fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character."[22] These requirements are "fundamental and essential" because without these, there is no due process as mandated by the Constitution. These "fundamental and essential requirements" cannot be taken away by legislation because they are part of constitutional due process. These "fundamental and essential requirements" are:(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. x x x. | |||||
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2010-05-05 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Prosecutors are endowed with ample powers in order that they may properly fulfill their assigned role in the administration of justice. It should be realized, however, that when a man is hailed to court on a criminal charge, it brings in its wake problems not only for the accused but for his family as well. Therefore, it behooves a prosecutor to weigh the evidence carefully and to deliberate thereon to determine the existence of a prima facie case before filing the information in court. Anything less would be a dereliction of duty.[29] | |||||
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2008-12-04 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| A preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case; sufficient proof of the guilt of the criminal respondent must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to order an acquittal.[35] Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair; the officer conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the end in view of determining whether or not an information may be prepared against the accused.[36] After all, the purpose of preliminary investigation is not only to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent therein is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial; it is just as well for the purpose of securing the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial.[37] More importantly, in the appraisal of the case presented to him for resolution, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice and less to prosecute.[38] | |||||
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2008-09-30 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Equally clear to us, there was no manifest abuse of discretion on the part of Director Palanca-Santiago for her refusal to inhibit herself in the reinvestigation. Even if a preliminary investigation resembles a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case,[49] public prosecutors could not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged.[50] They are not considered judges, by the nature of their functions, but merely quasi-judicial officers.[51] Worth-stressing, one adverse ruling by itself would not prove bias and prejudice against a party sufficient to disqualify even a judge.[52] Hence, absent proven allegations of specific conduct showing prejudice and hostility, we cannot impute grave abuse of discretion here on respondent director. To ask prosecutors to recuse themselves on reinvestigation upon every unfavorable ruling in a case would cause unwarranted delays in the prosecution of actions. | |||||
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2008-08-13 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| And while it is this Court's general policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, leaving the investigating officers sufficient discretion to determine probable cause,[43] we have nonetheless made some exceptions to the general rule, such as when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority,[44] resulting from a grave abuse of discretion. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause, since the same must be decided inthe light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge (public prosecutor) or run counter to the clear dictates of reason.[45] | |||||
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2003-08-20 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| We agree with the OCA's findings and observations. Respondent judge's reliance on Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure[5] to justify his refusal to conduct a preliminary investigation is misplaced. Under the similarly entitled section now of Rule 112 already effective December 1, 2000, just before the December 5, 2000 Order of respondent judge was issued[6], the only instance where an information for an offense which requires a preliminary investigation may be filed directly with the court is when an accused is lawfully detained without a warrant and he expressly refuses to waive in writing the provisions of Art. 125[7] of the Revised Penal Code.[8] If the accused refuses or fails to sign the requisite waiver, an information shall forthwith be filed against him, subject to his right to move for reinvestigation within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of said information. The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over for trial for a criminal offense and hence at the risk of incarceration or some other penalty is not a mere formal or technical right but a substantive right.[9] Hence, any exception to the enjoyment of said right must be strictly construed. In the instant case, nowhere is it shown or indicated in the assailed order that the accused in Criminal Case No. 3222 refused to waive, expressly and in writing, the provisions of Art. 125. Moreover, that said accused did not resist arrest is immaterial, as voluntary surrender is not among the exceptions to the mandatory requirement of preliminary investigation in criminal prosecution. Respondent judge, therefore, had no valid reason to refuse conducting the preliminary investigation. | |||||
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2003-07-21 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| In Sales v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,[184] quoting Allado v. Diokno,[185] this Court ruled that the Bill of Rights guarantees the preservation of our natural rights, viz:"The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect the people against arbitrary and discriminatory use of political power. This bundle of rights guarantees the preservation of our natural rights which include personal liberty and security against invasion by the government or any of its branches or instrumentalities."[186] (emphasis supplied) We need, however, to fine tune this pronouncement of the Court, considering that certain rights in our Bill of Rights, for example habeas corpus, have been identified not as a natural right, but a civil right created by law. Likewise, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures has been identified in Simon as a civil right, without expounding however what civil right meant therein - whether a natural right existing before the constitution and protected by it, thus acquiring the status of a civil right; or a right created merely by law and non-existent in the absence of law. To understand the nature of the right against unreasonable search and seizure and the corollary right to exclusion of evidence obtained therefrom, we turn a heedful eye on the history, concept and purpose of these guarantees. | |||||
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2003-02-10 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| The Petition further alleges that the foregoing development was discussed by Samuel P. Hull Jr. and Kenneth E. Roe -- the international operations director, and the chairman and chief executive officer, respectively, of Burns and Roe. As a result, Hull enplaned for Manila and met with Disini at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. This time, Disini not only assured Hull that he could influence Marcos to cause the reversal of the Decision awarding the consulting contract to Ebasco, but he also made a commitment to Hull that the former would obtain for Westinghouse the prime contract for the entire nuclear power plant project on a turn-key basis; and for Burns & Roe, the award of the main architectural and engineering subcontract for the same project.[13] | |||||