This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2012-06-13 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| From AAA's testimony, it can be inferred that the covering of the mouth, the poking of the knife and the insertion of Victor's penis into her vagina were all happening at almost the same time. Hence, it is not difficult to understand why "AAA" answered "yes" when asked by the defense counsel if Victor was covering her mouth and poking a knife at her neck when he inserted his penis into her vagina. Moreover, "[r]ape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. For such an offense is not analogous to a person's achievement or accomplishment as to be worth recalling or reliving; rather, it is something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche for life and which her conscious and subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a rape victim cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying experience she had undergone."[51] In this case, "AAA" was just 16 years old when she was cruelly abused by Victor. She was also later found possessed of low level intelligence. A fortiori, we must "accord to her greater understanding, consideration, and sensitivity as she relives, through her testimony, her harrowing [experience] at [Victor's] hands."[52] This also goes true with respect to the inconsistencies pointed out by Victor, which the Court finds too flimsy and trivial to merit serious consideration.[53] To reiterate, it is not unnatural to find minor discrepancies in the testimony of a rape victim as she cannot be expected to remember every minute detail of her ordeal. [54] | |||||
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2009-10-02 |
BRION, J. |
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| AAA's Certificate of Live Birth clearly shows that she was born on January 29, 1984 and, therefore, was below 18 years old when the rape was committed on November 28, 1998. However, AAA's relationship with the appellant was not alleged in the Information; neither was it sufficiently proven during trial. In People v. Alcoreza[68] where we met the same situation present in this case, we said: . . .Although the prosecution established that Mary Joy was the daughter of Melita, it failed to offer the marriage contract of the appellant and Melita which would establish that Mary Joy is the stepdaughter of the appellant. The testimony of Melita and even the admission of the appellant regarding their marriage do not meet the required standard of proof. The Court cannot rely on the disputable presumption that when a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, they are presumed to be married. Relationship as a qualifying circumstance in rape must not only be alleged clearly. It must also be proved beyond reasonable doubt, just as the crime itself. Neither can it be argued that without the marriage contract, a common-law relationship between the appellant and Melita was still proved and this should qualify the crime at bar. To be sure, what the Information alleged is that the appellant is the stepfather of Mary Joy. It made no mention of a common-law relationship between the appellant and Melita. Hence, to convict appellant with qualified rape on the basis of the common-law relationship is to violate his right to be properly informed of the accusation against him. | |||||
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2003-09-23 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Likewise, the relationship between appellant and Michelle was not established with the same degree of proof. While the information alleged that the victim was appellant's stepdaughter, the prosecution failed to prove the said relationship. For appellant to be considered the stepfather of the victim, he must be legally married to her mother.[26] The testimony of Lutgarda and the admission of the appellant regarding their marriage do not meet the required standard of proof.[27] The best evidence of their marriage is the marriage certificate itself, absent any showing that the same was lost or destroyed.[28] | |||||
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2003-09-03 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| Neither is Marites the "niece" of appellant and hence, a "relative within the third civil degree," as alleged in the Information. The prosecution utterly failed to prove that appellant is legally married to Marites' aunt. In fact, it did not present the marriage contract between them to establish that Marites is appellant's niece, a relative within the third civil degree by affinity. Relationship, as a qualifying circumstance in rape, must not only be alleged clearly; it must also be proved beyond reasonable doubt, just as the crime itself.[30] | |||||
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2003-06-26 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The prosecution failed to establish the relationship of Danly as the stepdaughter of appellant since the prosecution did not offer in evidence the marriage certificate between appellant and Danly's mother. If appellant and Danly's mother were not legally married, a common-law relationship between appellant and Danly's mother would obviously exist. However, the Information did not allege a common-law relationship between appellant and Danly's mother but rather a legitimate relationship since the Information described Danly as appellant's stepdaughter.[41] | |||||
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2003-01-24 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| In light of the facts established by the prosecution, we believe that accused-appellant intended to have carnal knowledge of private complainant. The overt acts of accused-appellant proven by the prosecution were not mere preparatory acts. By the series of his overt acts, accused-appellant had commenced the execution of rape which, if not for his spontaneous desistance, will ripen into the crime of rape. Although accused-appellant desisted from performing all the acts of execution however his desistance was not spontaneous as he was impelled to do so only because of the sudden and unexpected arrival of Rossel. Hence, accused-appellant is guilty only of attempted rape.[58] In a case of similar factual backdrop as this case, we held:"Applying the foregoing jurisprudence and taking into account Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, the appellant can only be convicted of attempted rape. He commenced the commission of rape by removing his clothes, undressing and kissing his victim and lying on top of her. However, he failed to perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his own spontaneous desistance, i.e., by the timely arrival of the victim's brother. Thus, his penis merely touched Mary Joy's private organ. Accordingly, as the crime committed by the appellant is attempted rape, the penalty to be imposed on him should be an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum." | |||||