This case has been cited 8 times or more.
|
2014-02-26 |
PEREZ, J. |
||||
| identified the appellant as the defiler of her chastity.[32] Simply put, the positive assertions of AAA that he raped her are entitled to greater weight. While denial and alibi are legitimate defenses in rape cases, bare assertions to this effect cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the victim,[33] as in this case. Also, appellant's alibi that on the night the rape incident happened, he was at the barangay hall doing his job as radio operator and at 12:00 midnight he already went home, failed to sufficiently establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at | |||||
|
2008-04-09 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
||||
| Tersely put, the credibility of the offended party is crucial in determining the guilt of a person accused of rape. By the very nature of this crime, it is usually only the victim who can testify as to its occurrence. Thus, in rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Elsewise stated, the lone testimony of the offended party, if credible, suffices to warrant a conviction for rape.[41] | |||||
|
2008-02-19 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
||||
| It must be emphasized that while denial and alibi are legitimate defenses in rape cases, bare assertions thereof cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the victim.[17] For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must not only prove his presence at another place at the time of the commission of the offense, but he must also demonstrate that it would be physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.[18] In People v. Grefaldia,[19] we held:Alibi is one of the weakest defenses. It is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must establish with clear and convincing evidence not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Appellant failed to conclusively show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. [20] | |||||
|
2004-02-05 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
||||
| Appellant seeks refuge in the defense of alibi which we have consistently regarded as "the much abused sanctuary of felons and which is considered as an argument with a bad reputation . . . It is, to say the least, the weakest defense which must be taken with caution being easily fabricated."[14] Such defense cannot prevail over the positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.[15] In this case, two prosecution witnesses, Marissa dela Cruz and Reggie Malubay, positively identified appellant as the culprit. Furthermore, the defense failed to establish that it was physically impossible for the appellant to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. For its part, the prosecution has proved that the place where the crime took place was only 100 to 150 meters, more or less, away from the house where appellant and his companions had a drinking spree. Clearly, it was possible for him to be at such place when the crime was committed. It is well settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, accused must not only prove his presence at another place at the time of the commission of the offense, but he must also demonstrate that it would be physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.[16] | |||||
|
2003-12-11 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
||||
| When the victim cannot testify on the actual commission of the rape because she had been rendered unconscious before the act was committed, the conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence. Such evidence is admissible, provided that more than one circumstance is duly proven, and that the totality or the unbroken chain of the circumstances proven lead to no other logical conclusion than that of the guilt of the accused.[61] | |||||
|
2003-10-16 |
PER CURIAM |
||||
| Likewise, the alibi of appellant that he was farming in Kalibuhan and was not able to visit his family at the alleged date of the first and second incidents is puerile. For his alibi to prosper, he must not only prove his presence at another place at the time of the commission of the offense, but he must demonstrate that it would be physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.[39] Since Barangay Banali is just a four (4)-hour walk from Kalibuhan appellant was not so far away that he could not have been physically present at the crime scene at the time of its commission. | |||||
|
2003-02-24 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| The defense of alibi, like a bare denial, is weak. But the testimony of Lierma strengthens appellant's position. In any event, the prosecution has the burden to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. In the light of the testimonial evidence for the defense vis-à-vis the version of the incident presented by the prosecution, we are not convinced that the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The rule is clear that the guilt of the accused must be proved with moral certainty. The prosecution, on its part, must rely on the strength of its own evidence and must not simply depend on the weakness of the defense. The slightest possibility of an innocent man being convicted for an offense he has never committed, particularly where capital punishment is imposed, would be far more dreadful than letting a guilty person go unpunished for a crime he might have perpetrated.[53] Nothing less than life is at stake and any court decision authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as possible.[54] This is a case, however, where the identity of the alleged malefactor has not been sufficiently established by evidence on record. Given the evidence before us in this review, we hold that appellant should be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. | |||||
|
2002-05-29 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| All told, the defenses of denial and alibi interposed by accused-appellant cannot prevail over the positive, direct and categorical assertion of private complainant.[19] Subjected to the severest scrutiny, we are convinced that the trial court which had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified, did not err in giving full faith and credence to private complainant's testimony. | |||||