This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2010-08-08 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Even though the sale of the land to petitioner took place before the judgment of the trial court in favor of Swift and the issuance of the writ of execution over the property in question, failure to register it with the Register of Deeds negated any priority which he may have acquired by virtue of the earlier sale. Elementary is the rule that it is the act of registration which gives validity to transfer or liens created upon land registered under the Torrens System.[22] This is clear in Section 51 and Section 52 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, also known as the Property Registration Decree, which read: Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. | |||||
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2008-03-28 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. [17] Lavides v. Pre, 419 Phil. 665, 672 (2001). | |||||
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2005-02-17 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The preference created by the levy on attachment is not diminished even by the subsequent registration of the prior sale. This is so because an attachment is a proceeding in rem.[19] It is against the particular property, enforceable against the whole world. The attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself.[20] Such a proceeding, in effect, means that the property attached is an indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owner's debt.[21] The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law. | |||||
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2005-01-17 |
TINGA, J. |
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| In this connection, Marquez's obstention of title to the property and the subsequent transfer thereof to CRB cannot help the latter's cause. In a situation where a party has actual knowledge of the claimant's actual, open and notorious possession of the disputed property at the time of registration, as in this case, the actual notice and knowledge are equivalent to registration, because to hold otherwise would be to tolerate fraud and the Torrens system cannot be used to shield fraud. [65] | |||||
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2002-03-19 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| "The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the land, and in all cases under this Act the registration shall be made in the office of the register of deeds for the province or city, where the land lies." True, registration is not the operative act for a mortgage to be binding between the parties. But to third persons, it is indispensible.[49] In the present case, the adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens were annotated on the title on October 30, 1979 and December 10, 1979, respectively; the real estate mortgage over the subject property was registered by respondent only on March 14, 1980. Settled in this jurisdiction is the doctrine that a prior registration of a lien creates a preference.[50] Even a subsequent registration of the prior mortgage will not diminish this preference, which retroacts to the date of the annotation of the notice of lis pendens and the adverse claim.[51] Thus, respondent's failure to register the real estate mortgage[52] prior to these annotations, resulted in the mortgage being binding only between it and the mortgagor, Sulit. Petitioners, being third parties to the mortgage, were not bound by it.[53] Contrary to respondent's claim that petitioners were in bad faith because they already had knowledge of the existence of the mortgage in favor of respondent when they caused the aforesaid annotations, petitioner Edilberto Cruz said that they only knew of this mortgage when respondent intervened in the RTC proceedings.[54] | |||||