This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2011-02-16 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| as the Commission of the Offense[10] | |||||
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2005-11-11 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.[41] The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu on April 19, 1994, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu's sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent payments made by Yu in the amounts of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 and P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show that the certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all the elements of the offense charged had been committed in Parañaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of Fukuzume in Parañaque; that with the intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended that he is a representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said scrap wires; that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount of P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage. Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latter's house in Parañaque and, by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his money. | |||||
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2004-05-18 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| In Erquiaga v. Court of Appeals,[16] we ruled that conspiracy, as a rule, has to be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself and shown as clearly as the commission of the crime. However, conspiracy need not be shown by direct evidence, but may take the form of circumstances which, if taken together, would conclusively show that the accused came to an agreement to commit a crime and decided to carry it out with their full cooperation and participation. | |||||