This case has been cited 9 times or more.
|
2013-06-26 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
||||
| Executive Order (EO) No. 1008 vests upon the CIAC original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with, contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines, whether the dispute arises before or after the completion of the contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof. By express provision of Section 19 thereof, the arbitral award of the CIAC is final and unappealable, except on questions of law, which are appealable to the Supreme Court. With the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 7902 and promulgation of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the CIAC was included in the enumeration of quasi-judicial agencies whose decisions or awards may be appealed to the CA in a petition for review under Rule 43. Such review of the CIAC award may involve either questions of fact, of law, or of fact and law.[23] | |||||
|
2009-06-30 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| Similarly, Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure merely mentions several quasi-judicial agencies without exclusivity in its phraseology.[29] The enumeration of the agencies therein mentioned is not exclusive.[30] The introductory phrase "[a]mong these agencies are" preceding the enumeration of specific quasi-judicial agencies only highlights the fact that the list is not meant to be exclusive or conclusive. Further, the overture stresses and acknowledges the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies not included in the enumeration but should be deemed included.[31] | |||||
|
2006-12-20 |
TINGA, J. |
||||
| Other recognized exceptions are as follows: (1) when there is a very clear showing of grave abuse of discretion[20] resulting in lack or loss of jurisdiction as when a party was deprived of a fair opportunity to present its position before the Arbitral Tribunal or when an award is obtained through fraud or the corruption of arbitrators,[21] (2) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the CIAC,[22] and (3) when a party is deprived of administrative due process.[23] | |||||
|
2006-08-07 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| While the general rule is that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court, there are, however, recognized exceptions[11] thereto, such as when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court or, in this case, the CTA.[12] | |||||
|
2006-05-04 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
| For their part, the Heirs averred that execution pending appeal is a matter addressed to the second discretion of the trial court and cannot be nullified by the appellate court unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown. They claimed that NAPOCOR failed to prove that the trial court was guilty of grave abuse of discretion in granting their motion for execution pending appeal. They pointed out that it was justified by good reasons, and that they adduced proof of the fair market value of the property and posted the required P1,000,000.00 bond. The Heirs cited the ruling of the CA in National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim[19] and Municipality of Biñan, Laguna v. Court of Appeals.[20] | |||||
|
2006-05-04 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
| Petitioners' reliance on the ruling of the CA in National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim,[37] is misplaced. We agree with the following ratiocination of the CA in its decision:We note that in support of its case, private respondents cited the case of National Power Corporation v. Hon. Amer Ibrahim, et al. (CA-G.R. SP No. 41897) which was decided by the Special Seventeenth Division of this Court. In the said case, the discretionary execution granted by the public respondent was upheld. While we are not unmindful of the findings in the said case, it is our opinion that based on the circumstances obtaining in this case, it would best serve the ends of justice if the appeal on the merits of the case is first resolved without any execution pending appeal, not only because the total amount involved is quite substantial - ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P113,532,500.00), but also because of the other matters involved in the appeal.(citation omitted)[38] | |||||
|
2004-03-29 |
PUNO, J. |
||||
| As a general rule, rules of procedure apply to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, hence, retrospective in nature. However, the general rule is not without an exception. Retrospective application is allowed if no vested rights are impaired.[6] Thus, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. de Leon[7] our ruling that the appropriate mode of review from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts is a petition for review under Sec. 60 of R.A. No. 6657 and not an ordinary appeal as Sec. 61 thereof seems to imply, was not given retroactive application. We held that to give our ruling a retrospective application would prejudice petitioner's pending appeals brought under said Sec. 61 before the Court of Appeals at a time when there was yet no clear pronouncement as to the proper interpretation of the seemingly conflicting Secs. 60 and 61. In fine, to apply the Court's ruling retroactively would prejudice LBP's right to appeal because its pending appeals would then be dismissed outright on a mere technicality thereby sacrificing the substantial merits of the cases. | |||||
|
2004-03-02 |
TINGA, J, |
||||
| Megaworld sought reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' Decision arguing, among other things, that the appellate court ignored the ruling in Metro Construction, Inc. v. Chatham Properties[24] that the review of the CIAC award may involve either questions of fact, law, or both fact and law. | |||||
|
2002-08-08 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
||||
| Court.[14] There is no convincing reason why appeals from the COSLAP should be treated differently from those arising from other quasi-judicial bodies, the decisions of which are directly appealable to the CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules. Finally, Metro Construction, Inc. v. Chat ham Properties, Inc.[15] held that Section 19 of Executive Order No. 1008 -- which had deemed arbitral awards of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) to be appealable to the Supreme | |||||