This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2007-09-13 |
TINGA, J. |
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| In fact, the Court has at various times applied the foregoing provision without regard to the filing or non-filing of an appeal by a co-accused, so long as the judgment was favorable to him. In such cases, the co-accused already withdrew his appeal,[59] failed to file an appellant's brief,[60] or filed a notice of appeal with the trial court but eventually withdrew the same.[61] Even more, in these cases, all the accused appealed from the judgment of conviction but for one reason or another, their conviction had already become final and executory. Nevertheless, the Court still applied to them the favorable judgment in favor of their co-accused.[62] Therefore, we cannot find a reason to treat Lindong differently, especially so in this case where the public officer accused of violating the anti-graft law has been acquitted, and the appeal by Lindong was dismissed on a technicality. | |||||
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2007-07-17 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| In addition, complainant must be awarded another P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, this additional award should not apply to Pacursa who has withdrawn his appeal as the same is not favorable to him.[44] Hence, the additional monetary award can only be imposed upon petitioner who pursued the present appeal.[45] | |||||
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2007-07-09 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Furthermore, we note that the separate appeals interposed by Manochon and Anamot were denied by this Court on November 11 and December 16, 2002, respectively. As their convictions were affirmed earlier, they were already made to suffer the erroneous penalty imposed by the trial court. Nevertheless, they shall benefit from the favorable modification of the minimum penalty made herein. Section 11, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that "an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter."[61] | |||||
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2006-10-23 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| We agree with appellant's acquittal of the charge of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm. With the effectivity of Republic Act No. 8294[29] on 6 July 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of homicide or murder is no longer treated as a separate offense, but only as a special aggravating circumstance.[30] Thus, where an accused used an unlicensed firearm in committing homicide or murder, he may no longer be charged with what used to be two separate offenses of homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and qualified illegal possession of firearms used in homicide or murder under Presidential Decree No. 1866.[31] Although the killing was committed on 27 January 1997, being favorable to appellant who was not shown to be a habitual delinquent, the amendatory law was properly given retroactive application pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.[32] Thus, insofar as it spared appellant a separate conviction for illegal possession of firearms, Republic Act No. 8294 has to be given retroactive application in Criminal Case No. 97-13707. | |||||
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2001-12-14 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Robbery with homicide is a special complex crime against property.[50] Absent clear and convincing evidence that the crime of robbery was perpetrated, and that, on occasion or by reason thereof, a homicide was committed, an accused cannot be found guilty of robbery with homicide, but only of homicide or murder, as the case may be.[51] There is a paucity of evidence to show that appellant had a hand in the killing of the victim. We cannot convict appellant for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide or for the separate crimes of robbery or homicide when the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court is plainly inadequate and unconvincing in proving appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. | |||||