This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2010-01-19 |
ABAD, J. |
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| The Court notes that, when it modified the award of civil damages to the heirs of Cortez, the CA made both accused Aleman and Datulayta, jointly and severally liable, for the damages as modified. But the appeal by one or more of several accused cannot affect those who did not appeal, except if the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to them.[14] Here accused Datulayta pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide and the trial court ordered him to pay only P50,000.00 in civil indemnity to the heirs of Cortez. The CA erred in expanding that liability when he did not appeal from his conviction.[15] | |||||
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2002-12-09 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| "fn">[45] For it to prosper, the accused herein must be able to prove (a) that he was present in another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.[46] In the case at bar, appellant failed to meet these requisites.[47] While he tried to establish his presence in another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense, his testimony did not preclude any doubt about the physical impossibility of his | |||||
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2002-11-13 |
VITUG, J. |
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| The defense of alibi proffered by appellants is much too weak against the positive identification made by the eyewitnesses. It is not enough for an alibi to prosper to prove that the person raising it has been somewhere else when the crime is committed; it must likewise be demonstrated that it would have been physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.[15] Where there is the least chance to be present at the locus criminis, alibi will not hold much water.[16] The bare evidence given by appellants to vouch their individual claims and establish alibi is far from being iron-clad against the possibility of their having been at the crime scene. | |||||
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2002-06-05 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| We are not convinced. Well-settled is the rule that alibi is always viewed with suspicion, because it is inherently weak and unreliable.[29] The defense of alibi assumes significance or strength when it is amply corroborated by a credible witness.[30] For alibi to prosper, the accused must be able to (a) prove his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him at that time to have been at the scene of the crime.[31] | |||||
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2002-04-19 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| …If truly he is innocent of the crime, he should not ask for a lower sentence instead he should file a counter affidavit and present witnesses that may exculpate him from the crime charged. He was given a counsel to defend his case but nowhere in the record that he initiated a counter affidavit…[38] Coming now to the defense of alibi interposed by appellant. For alibi to prosper, appellant must prove: a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense; and b) the physical impossibility for him to be at the scene of the crime.[39] We note that appellant did not deny that he was in the house of Tata Lope on the night of October 16, 1993, when the alleged offense took place. Worse, we further note that appellant did not show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the room where the victim was when she was ravished. We are thus constrained to conclude that appellant's alibi is but a mere concoction deserving no serious consideration. | |||||