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LENIDO LUMANOG v. JAIME N. SALAZAR

This case has been cited 4 times or more.

2010-09-07
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Upon the instruction of Atty. Rous, he took down the statement of Lorenzo, the three (3) of them in one (1) corner of the room while over at the receiving area there were the secretary and a lady lawyer.  The statement of Lorenzo was in Tagalog, typewritten in question-and-answer form. Each time after he had asked a question, Atty. Rous would in turn ask Lorenzo if he wanted to answer it, and Lorenzo would answer yes.  He was at the typewriter, and the two (2) (Atty. Rous and Lorenzo) were infront of him, seated across each other.  The taking of the statement started at about 3:10 in the afternoon and was finished in more than one (1) hour.  He asked Lorenzo to read first his statement, and then Atty. Rous read it also.  Next, they went up to the office of Fiscal Refuerzo, but was referred by the secretary to the inquest fiscal on duty, Fiscal Ben dela Cruz.  At his office, Fiscal dela Cruz asked Lorenzo to stand infront of him and asked if the statement was voluntarily given by him, if what was contained therein was true, and if he was ready to swear before him. Lorenzo answered yes, and the subscribing of his statement before Fiscal dela Cruz was also witnessed by Atty. Rous.[36]  Lorenzo had earlier told him and his companions at the PARAC office that his participation in the ambush-slay of Abadilla was that of a lookout, and that he was only forced to join the group because of the threat to his family.[37]
2006-09-19
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment. The requisites for newly discovered evidence under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: (a) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.[26]
2000-05-31
GONZAGA-REYES, J.
Basically, petitioner claims that he is entitled to retain possession of the subject property until payment of the loan and the value of the necessary and useful improvements he made upon such property.[10] According to petitioner, neither the Court of Appeals' decision in G.R. CV No. 42065 nor this Court's decision in G.R. No. 120832 ordered immediate delivery of possession of the subject property to respondent.
2000-05-31
GONZAGA-REYES, J.
Due to the overlapping of titles, petitioner filed an action for quieting of title and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City against respondent on May 17, 1990. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 20124-90. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment on October 19, 1992, in favor of petitioner, declaring him to be the lawful owner of the disputed property. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the transaction entered into by the parties, as evidenced by their contract, was an equitable mortgage, not a sale.[5] The appellate court's decision was based on the inadequacy of the consideration agreed upon by the parties, on its finding that the payment of a large portion of the "purchase price" was made after the execution of the deed of sale in several installments of minimal amounts; and finally, on the fact that petitioner did not take steps to confirm his rights or to obtain title over the property for several years after the execution of the deed of sale. As a consequence of its decision, the appellate court also declared Original Certificate of Title No.P-11566 issued in favor of petitioner to be null and void. On July 8, 1996, in a case docketed as G. R. No. 120832, this Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and on September 11, 1996, we denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.