Lawyerly

GR No. 190798

2016-01-27

PEREZ, J.

The right to be assisted by counsel is an indispensable component of due process in criminal prosecution.[27] As such, right to counsel is one of the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused.[28] A deprivation of the right to counsel strips the accused of an equality in arms resulting in the denial of a level playing field.[29] Simply put, an accused without counsel is essentially deprived of a fair hearing which is tantamount to a grave denial of due process.[30]

GR No. 190798

2016-01-27

RONALD IBAÑEZ v. PEOPLE

PEREZ, J.

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the petitioners must not only prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was at another place at the time of the commission of the offense but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.[48] Emilio himself admitted that he was just one kilometer away from the crime scene when the incident happened during the unholy hour of 1:00 a.m. of July 15, 2001. As such, Emilio failed to prove physical impossibility of his being at the crime scene on the date and time in question. Just like denial, alibi is an inherently weak defense that cannot prevail over the positive identification by the witnesses of the petitioners as the perpetrators of the crime.[49] In the present case, Emilio was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as one of the assailants. Moreover, alibi becomes less credible if offered by the accused himself and his immediate relatives as they are expected to make declarations in his favor,[50] as in this case, where Emilio, his father and brother insisted that the former was somewhere else when the incident occurred. For these reasons, Emilio's defense of alibi will not hold.

GR No. 200531

2012-12-05

PEOPLE v. RADBY ESTOYA Y MATEO

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

Estoya further attempts to raise doubts in AAA's testimony by questioning AAA's failure to offer tenacious resistance during the supposed sexual assault. We are not swayed. We must keep in mind that AAA was only 14 years of age at the time of the rape, and at such a tender age, she could not be expected to put up resistance as would be expected from a mature woman. Also, Estoya had threatened AAA that he would stab her with a knife if she resisted. In any case, the law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits herself against her will to the rapist's lust because of fear for life and personal safety.[19]

GR No. 175315

2010-08-09

PEOPLE v. ELIZER BEDUYA

DEL CASTILLO, J.

Further, the failure of Bughao to immediately report the incident to the police authorities and to extend help to the victim cannot destroy his credibility as a witness. There is no standard of behavior when a person becomes a witness to a shocking or gruesome event.[30] "The workings of a human mind placed under severe emotional stress are unpredictable and people react differently x x x."[31] The determining factor to consider is that Bughao testified in candid and straightforward manner and implicated Elizer and Ric as the perpetrators of the crime.

GR Nos. 148712-15

2004-01-21

PEOPLE v. DOMINADOR CACHOLA Y SALAZAR

PER CURIAM

Neither can the question of the legality of the warrantless arrest of the appellants be raised for the first time before this Court. As arrests fall into the question of the exercise by the trial court of its jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the question should have been raised prior to their arraignment. That the appellants objected to the arrests prior to the arraignment[29] is unsubstantiated. Their claim that they requested an extension of time to file a motion to quash the information or to dismiss the case,[30] which the trial court allegedly denied, cannot save the day for them. The fact remains that before arraignment, no such motion was filed. Even assuming that their arrest was illegal, their act of entering a plea during their arraignment constituted a waiver of their right to question their arrest.[31]

GR Nos. 150983-84

2003-11-21

PEOPLE v. ROGELIO TALAVERA Y RULLODA

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

This is likewise untenable. The law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits herself against her will to the rapist's lust because of fear for life and personal safety.[6]

GR No. 137782

2003-04-01

PEOPLE v. ARTURO NICOLAS Y RINGOR

CARPIO MORALES, J.

Appellant's alibi thus fails vis-à-vis the positive and categorical assertion of prosecution witnesses.[36] It is worthless, considered with suspicion and always received with caution not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because it is easily fabricated and concocted.[37] Being negative in nature and self-serving, it cannot secure worthiness more than that placed upon the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence.[38]

GR No. 147764

2003-01-16

PEOPLE v. DANILO CUETO Y CUETO

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Likewise, there is nothing arbitrary or capricious when the trial court ordered counsel de oficio to cross-examine Teresita and Ephraim immediately after their respective direct examinations. A reading of the transcripts of stenographic notes shows that the questions propounded by counsel de oficio during the cross-examination were sufficiently effective, meaning, they were reasonable under the circumstances.[12] In the case of Teresita's cross-examination, the counsel de oficio even manifested his observation that there was an inconsistency between her testimony and her sworn statement.[13] Nonetheless, the cross-examination conducted on Ephraim more than made up for whatever perceived deficiency there might have been in Teresita's cross-examination.[14] If accused-appellant, through his counsel of record, felt prejudiced by the order of the trial judge for counsel de oficio to cross-examine Teresita and Ephraim in the absence of the counsel of record, then he could have asked the trial court to recall Teresita and Ephraim for further cross-examination.

GR Nos. 139240-43

2002-11-12

PEOPLE v. ROLANDO ASPURIA

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

fabrication, it also cannot prevail over witnesses' positive identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. In any event, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the accused can prove his presence at another place at the time of its commission, it is likewise essential that he can show physical impossibility for him to be at the locus delicti.[16] This, accused-appellant failed to do. On the matter of damages, we affirm the trial court's award of civil indemnity of P50,000.00 in each of the four criminal cases. In addition, however, complainants should also be entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, in line with

GR No. 138647

2002-09-27

PEOPLE v. MARLON BULFANGO Y PEÑAFIEL

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

carnapping, not to mention the present murder case.[6] Accused-appellant's imputation of "extreme partiality" on the part of the trial court is clearly unfounded. Verily, the statements were made after full-blown trial, long after the court had reached a conclusion with regard to accused-appellant's guilt. From a reading of the records and the transcripts of stenographic notes, this Court finds no indication of bias on the part of the trial court, and accused-appellant has failed to show any other instance save for the above-quoted statements. In any event, we find that the trial court was correct in disregarding accused-appellant's defense of denial and alibi. Denial is an inherently weak defense vis-à-vis the positive and categorical assertion of prosecution witnesses.[7] Between the

GR No. 130966

2001-12-13

PEOPLE v. DIONISIO GUANSON

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Finally, accused-appellants' defense theory rests on alibi. Like denial, alibi was not looked upon favorably by the trial court. Not only is it one of the weakest defenses due to its being capable of easy fabrication, it also cannot prevail over witnesses' positive identification of accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. In order for alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the accused can prove his being at another place at the time of the commission of the crime, it is likewise essential that he can show physical impossibility for him to be at the locus delicti.[15] This, accused-appellants failed to do.

	GR No. 190798 2016-01-27	RONALD IBAÑEZ v. PEOPLE PEREZ, J.
The right to be assisted by counsel is an indispensable component of due process in criminal prosecution.[27] As such, right to counsel is one of the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused.[28] A deprivation of the right to counsel strips the accused of an equality in arms resulting in the denial of a level playing field.[29] Simply put, an accused without counsel is essentially deprived of a fair hearing which is tantamount to a grave denial of due process.[30]
	GR No. 190798 2016-01-27	RONALD IBAÑEZ v. PEOPLE PEREZ, J.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the petitioners must not only prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was at another place at the time of the commission of the offense but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.[48] Emilio himself admitted that he was just one kilometer away from the crime scene when the incident happened during the unholy hour of 1:00 a.m. of July 15, 2001. As such, Emilio failed to prove physical impossibility of his being at the crime scene on the date and time in question. Just like denial, alibi is an inherently weak defense that cannot prevail over the positive identification by the witnesses of the petitioners as the perpetrators of the crime.[49] In the present case, Emilio was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as one of the assailants. Moreover, alibi becomes less credible if offered by the accused himself and his immediate relatives as they are expected to make declarations in his favor,[50] as in this case, where Emilio, his father and brother insisted that the former was somewhere else when the incident occurred. For these reasons, Emilio's defense of alibi will not hold.
	GR No. 200531 2012-12-05	PEOPLE v. RADBY ESTOYA Y MATEO LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Estoya further attempts to raise doubts in AAA's testimony by questioning AAA's failure to offer tenacious resistance during the supposed sexual assault. We are not swayed. We must keep in mind that AAA was only 14 years of age at the time of the rape, and at such a tender age, she could not be expected to put up resistance as would be expected from a mature woman. Also, Estoya had threatened AAA that he would stab her with a knife if she resisted. In any case, the law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits herself against her will to the rapist's lust because of fear for life and personal safety.[19]
	GR No. 175315 2010-08-09	PEOPLE v. ELIZER BEDUYA DEL CASTILLO, J.
Further, the failure of Bughao to immediately report the incident to the police authorities and to extend help to the victim cannot destroy his credibility as a witness. There is no standard of behavior when a person becomes a witness to a shocking or gruesome event.[30] "The workings of a human mind placed under severe emotional stress are unpredictable and people react differently x x x."[31] The determining factor to consider is that Bughao testified in candid and straightforward manner and implicated Elizer and Ric as the perpetrators of the crime.
	GR Nos. 148712-15 2004-01-21	PEOPLE v. DOMINADOR CACHOLA Y SALAZAR PER CURIAM
Neither can the question of the legality of the warrantless arrest of the appellants be raised for the first time before this Court. As arrests fall into the question of the exercise by the trial court of its jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the question should have been raised prior to their arraignment. That the appellants objected to the arrests prior to the arraignment[29] is unsubstantiated. Their claim that they requested an extension of time to file a motion to quash the information or to dismiss the case,[30] which the trial court allegedly denied, cannot save the day for them. The fact remains that before arraignment, no such motion was filed. Even assuming that their arrest was illegal, their act of entering a plea during their arraignment constituted a waiver of their right to question their arrest.[31]
	GR Nos. 150983-84 2003-11-21	PEOPLE v. ROGELIO TALAVERA Y RULLODA YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
This is likewise untenable. The law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits herself against her will to the rapist's lust because of fear for life and personal safety.[6]
	GR No. 137782 2003-04-01	PEOPLE v. ARTURO NICOLAS Y RINGOR CARPIO MORALES, J.
Appellant's alibi thus fails vis-à-vis the positive and categorical assertion of prosecution witnesses.[36] It is worthless, considered with suspicion and always received with caution not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because it is easily fabricated and concocted.[37] Being negative in nature and self-serving, it cannot secure worthiness more than that placed upon the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence.[38]
	GR No. 147764 2003-01-16	PEOPLE v. DANILO CUETO Y CUETO YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Likewise, there is nothing arbitrary or capricious when the trial court ordered counsel de oficio to cross-examine Teresita and Ephraim immediately after their respective direct examinations. A reading of the transcripts of stenographic notes shows that the questions propounded by counsel de oficio during the cross-examination were sufficiently effective, meaning, they were reasonable under the circumstances.[12] In the case of Teresita's cross-examination, the counsel de oficio even manifested his observation that there was an inconsistency between her testimony and her sworn statement.[13] Nonetheless, the cross-examination conducted on Ephraim more than made up for whatever perceived deficiency there might have been in Teresita's cross-examination.[14] If accused-appellant, through his counsel of record, felt prejudiced by the order of the trial judge for counsel de oficio to cross-examine Teresita and Ephraim in the absence of the counsel of record, then he could have asked the trial court to recall Teresita and Ephraim for further cross-examination.
	GR Nos. 139240-43 2002-11-12	PEOPLE v. ROLANDO ASPURIA YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
fabrication, it also cannot prevail over witnesses' positive identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. In any event, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the accused can prove his presence at another place at the time of its commission, it is likewise essential that he can show physical impossibility for him to be at the locus delicti.[16] This, accused-appellant failed to do. On the matter of damages, we affirm the trial court's award of civil indemnity of P50,000.00 in each of the four criminal cases. In addition, however, complainants should also be entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, in line with
	GR No. 138647 2002-09-27	PEOPLE v. MARLON BULFANGO Y PEÑAFIEL YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
carnapping, not to mention the present murder case.[6] Accused-appellant's imputation of "extreme partiality" on the part of the trial court is clearly unfounded. Verily, the statements were made after full-blown trial, long after the court had reached a conclusion with regard to accused-appellant's guilt. From a reading of the records and the transcripts of stenographic notes, this Court finds no indication of bias on the part of the trial court, and accused-appellant has failed to show any other instance save for the above-quoted statements. In any event, we find that the trial court was correct in disregarding accused-appellant's defense of denial and alibi. Denial is an inherently weak defense vis-à-vis the positive and categorical assertion of prosecution witnesses.[7] Between the
	GR No. 130966 2001-12-13	PEOPLE v. DIONISIO GUANSON YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Finally, accused-appellants' defense theory rests on alibi. Like denial, alibi was not looked upon favorably by the trial court. Not only is it one of the weakest defenses due to its being capable of easy fabrication, it also cannot prevail over witnesses' positive identification of accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. In order for alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the accused can prove his being at another place at the time of the commission of the crime, it is likewise essential that he can show physical impossibility for him to be at the locus delicti.[15] This, accused-appellants failed to do.

PEOPLE v. LOPE LIWANAG Y BUENAVENTURA