This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2015-11-10 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Since the Block 494 remained in private ownership, HATVI has neither factual nor legal basis to question the sale thereof by the Quezon City government for tax delinquency. As highest bidder at the tax delinquency sale, J.M. Tuason was acting well within its rights when it sold the property to THI which had the right to rely on what appears on the title covering the same. After the expiration of the redemption period, after all, a property acquired pursuant to a tax delinquency sale, like that purchased from a public auction sale,[47] passes to the purchaser, free from any encumbrance or third party claim[48] not inscribed on the certificate of title. Also, having purchased the property from J.M. Tuason, THI was likewise acting well-. within its rights to cause the subdivision thereof, offer the same to the general public and to utilize the same as security for the loan it obtained from Equitable Bank. Given that the property was purchased at a tax delinquency sale, on the other hand, Equitable Bank cannot be considered in bad faith when it primarily relied on what appeared on the title over the property. | |||||
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2014-01-15 |
REYES, J. |
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| With respect to Laborte's liability in his official and personal capacity, the Court finds that Laborte was simply implementing the lawful order of the PTA Management. As a general rule "the officer cannot be held personally liable with the corporation, whether civilly or otherwise, for the consequences of his acts, if acted for and in behalf of the corporation, within the scope of his authority and in good faith."[73] Furthermore, the Court also notes that the charges against petitioners Laborte and the PTA for grave coercion and for the violation of R.A. 6713[74] have all been dismissed.[75] Thus, the Court finds no basis to hold petitioner Laborte liable. | |||||
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2013-03-13 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| While ownership by one corporation of all or a great majority of stocks of another corporation and their interlocking directorates may serve as indicia of control, by themselves and without more, however, these circumstances are insufficient to establish an alter ego relationship or connection between DBP and PNB on the one hand and NMIC on the other hand, that will justify the puncturing of the latter's corporate cover. This Court has declared that "mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself sufficient ground for disregarding the separate corporate personality."[66] This Court has likewise ruled that the "existence of interlocking directors, corporate officers and shareholders is not enough justification to pierce the veil of corporate fiction in the absence of fraud or other public policy considerations."[67] | |||||
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2010-09-29 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| As is apparent from its disquisition, the RTC brushed aside the separate corporate existence of Kukan, Inc. and KIC on the main argument that Michael Chan owns 40% of the common shares of both corporations, obviously oblivious that overlapping stock ownership is a common business phenomenon. It must be remembered, however, that KIC's properties were the ones seized upon levy on execution and not that of Kukan, Inc. or of Michael Chan for that matter. Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of a substantial block of shares of a corporation does not, standing alone, provide sufficient justification for disregarding the separate corporate personality.[40] For this ground to hold sway in this case, there must be proof that Chan had control or complete dominion of Kukan and KIC's finances, policies, and business practices; he used such control to commit fraud; and the control was the proximate cause of the financial loss complained of by Morales. The absence of any of the elements prevents the piercing of the corporate veil.[41] And indeed, the records do not show the presence of these elements. | |||||
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2009-10-16 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Time and again, we have reiterated that mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not, by itself, a sufficient ground for disregarding a separate corporate personality.[74] It is basic that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from that composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related. Clear and convincing evidence is needed to pierce the veil of corporate fiction.[75] | |||||
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2007-09-28 |
CORONA, J. |
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| If any general rule can be laid down, it is that the corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity until sufficient reasons to the contrary appear. [33] It is only when the fiction or notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, perpetuate fraud or defend crime that the law will shred the corporate legal veil and regard it as a mere association of persons.[34] This is referred to as the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity. | |||||
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2005-08-12 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| In any case, petitioner PNCC, as majority stockholder, may not be held liable for UITC's obligation. A corporation, upon coming into existence, is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from those persons composing it as well as from any other legal entity to which it may be related.[38] The veil of corporate fiction may only be disregarded in cases where the corporate vehicle is being used to defeat public convenience, justify a wrong, protect fraud, or defend a crime.[39] Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself sufficient ground for disregarding the separate corporate personality.[40] To disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established.[41] | |||||