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PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS v. ANIANO A. DESIERTO

This case has been cited 4 times or more.

2013-09-11
BERSAMIN, J.
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must be considered, namely: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time when the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time when the prescriptive period is interrupted.[23]
2011-04-13
PEREZ, J.
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following shall be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription started to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.[23]
2011-04-13
PEREZ, J.
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is committed.  That an aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises," does not prevent the running of the prescriptive period.[29]  An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326.  Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of action.  In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action."[30]  It was in this accord that the Court confronted the question on the running of the prescriptive period in People v. Duque[31] which became the cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149),[32] and the subsequent cases[33] which Ombudsman Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of prescription too. Thus, we held in a catena of cases,[34] that if the violation of the special law was not known at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.
2004-01-16
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
We reiterated the above ruling in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto,[11] thus:"In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 Edsa Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions were made (PCGG vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 140232, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 767; Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, Note 14; Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto, supra, Note 16).  Moreover, no person would have dared to question the legality of those transactions.  Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the dated of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.