This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2010-12-07 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the President.[31] Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must be empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law. According to petitioner, such power cannot be presumed[32] since there is no provision in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth commission.[33] He adds that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting the President the continuing authority to reorganize his office, cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truth commission considering the aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as "reorganize," "transfer," "consolidate," "merge," and "abolish."[34] Insofar as it vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize the Office of the President to the extent of creating a public office, Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution and must be deemed repealed upon the effectivity thereof.[35] | |||||
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2010-08-09 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Further, the failure of Bughao to immediately report the incident to the police authorities and to extend help to the victim cannot destroy his credibility as a witness. There is no standard of behavior when a person becomes a witness to a shocking or gruesome event.[30] "The workings of a human mind placed under severe emotional stress are unpredictable and people react differently x x x."[31] The determining factor to consider is that Bughao testified in candid and straightforward manner and implicated Elizer and Ric as the perpetrators of the crime. | |||||
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2010-01-19 |
CORONA, J. |
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| This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession.[36] Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.[37] Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.[38] | |||||
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2009-07-03 |
BRION, J. |
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| In the 1903 case of U.S. v. Bergantino,[33] we accepted testimonial evidence to prove the minority and age of the accused in the absence of any document or other satisfactory evidence showing the date of birth. This was followed by U.S. v. Roxas[34] where the defendant's statement about his age was considered sufficient, even without corroborative evidence, to establish that he was a minor of 16 years at the time he committed the offense charged. Subsequently, in People v. Tismo,[35] the Court appreciated the minority and age of the accused on the basis of his claim that he was 17 years old at the time of the commission of the offense in the absence of any contradictory evidence or objection on the part of the prosecution. Then, in People v. Villagracia,[36] we found the testimony of the accused that he was less than 15 years old sufficient to establish his minority. We reiterated these dicta in the cases of People v. Morial[37] and David v. Court of Appeals,[38] and ruled that the allegations of minority and age by the accused will be accepted as facts upon the prosecution's failure to disprove the claim by contrary evidence. | |||||
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2002-09-17 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| in crimes against persons, and not in crimes against property.[49] Evident premeditation cannot also be appreciated as there was no evidence adduced that the execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. Besides, we have held that evident premeditation is inherent in robbery and should not have been considered against the accused.[50] Lastly, abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated as there was no evidence at all that appellants took advantage of their combined strength to consummate the crime. Mere numerical count of the accused does not by itself result in proof of this circumstance. All told, none of the aggravating circumstances alleged was properly proved, hence none could be utilized in imposing the penalty for the offense. Thus, we now come to the question of the proper penalty. The lower court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on appellants. This is legally erroneous and inappropriate. It should be corrected. | |||||
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2002-03-20 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Consonant with the constitutional precept that a person under custodial investigation should have a right to counsel "in every phase of the investigation,"[24] the Court has held in a number of cases that a person under custodial investigation should enjoy the right to counsel from its inception to its termination. Truly, the accused's counsel of choice must be present and must be able to advise and assist his client from the time he answers the first question until the time he signs the extra-judicial confession.[25] In People v. Morial,[26] the Court elucidated on the need for requiring a counsel's continuing presence throughout the custodial investigation in order to guarantee the accused's rights. | |||||