Lawyerly

You're currently signed in as:
User

ISMAEL V. SANTOS v. CA

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

	GR No. 162230 2014-08-12	ISABELITA C. VINUYA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO BERSAMIN, J.
The Court has further said in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[18]
	GR NO. 146068 2006-08-31	DR. REY C. TAMBONG v. R. JORGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[5] petitioner failed to show the first and second dates, namely, the date of receipt of the impugned NLRC Decision as well as the date of filing of his motion for reconsideration. Petitioner countered by stating that in the body of the petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals, it was explicitly stated that the NLRC Resolution dated May 11, 1999 was received by petitioner through counsel on July 30, 1999. He even reiterated this contention in his Reply. We held:The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the purpose of determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to be assailed. Therefore, that the petition for certiorari was filed forty-one (41) days from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of Appeals was not in any position to determine when this period commenced to run and whether the motion for reconsideration itself was filed on time since the material dates were not stated. It should not be assumed that in no event would the motion be filed later than fifteen (15) days. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
	GR NO. 141805 2005-08-08	GENEVIEVE C. POBRE v. CA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
However, Rule 65, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, as amended, prescribes a period of 60 days within which to file a special civil action for certiorari. The 60-day period was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.[31] Such right to a speedy disposition of the case pertains not only to a private complainant in a criminal case,[32] but to an accused as well.[33] While the periods set by law are technical rules of procedure, these are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets.[34] Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, have oft been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. The reason for rules of this nature is because the dispatch of business by courts would be impossible, and intolerable delays would result, without rules governing practice. Such rules are a necessary incident to the proper, efficient and orderly discharge of judicial functions.[35]
	GR No. 141805 2005-07-08	GENEVIEVE C. POBRE v. CA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
However, Rule 65, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, as amended, prescribes a period of 60 days within which to file a special civil action for certiorari. The 60-day period was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.[31] Such right to a speedy disposition of the case pertains not only to a private complainant in a criminal case,[32] but to an accused as well.[33] While the periods set by law are technical rules of procedure, these are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets.[34] Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, have oft been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. The reason for rules of this nature is because the dispatch of business by courts would be impossible, and intolerable delays would result, without rules governing practice. Such rules are a necessary incident to the proper, efficient and orderly discharge of judicial functions.[35]
	GR No. 147394 2004-08-11	SPS. MANUEL AND ROSEMARIE WEE v. ROSARIO D. GALVEZ QUISUMBING, J.
Anent the second issue, the petitioners aver that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding that the certification against forum shopping in Civil Case No. Q-99-37372 was valid, notwithstanding that it was not the plaintiff below, Rosario D. Galvez, who executed and signed the same, but her attorney-in-fact, Grace Galvez. Petitioners insist that there was nothing in the special power of attorney executed by Rosario D. Galvez in favor of Grace Galvez, which expressly conferred upon the latter the authority to execute and sign, on behalf of the former, the certificate of non-forum shopping. Petitioners point out that under Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the "plaintiff" or "principal party" who must sign the certification. They rely on our ruling in BA Savings Bank v. Sia,[16] that where the parties in an action are natural persons, the party himself is required to sign the certification, and where a representative is allowed in case of artificial persons, he must be specifically authorized to execute and sign the certification. The petitioners stress that Rosario D. Galvez failed to show any justifiable reason why her attorney-in-fact should be the one to sign the certification against forum shopping, instead of herself as the party, as required by Santos v. Court of Appeals.[17]
	GR No. 139607 2002-10-28	RAMON ISIDRO P. LAPID v. EMMANUEL D. LAUREA QUISUMBING, J.
was filed; and third, the date when notice of the denial thereof was received. [16] In the case before us, the petition filed with the CA failed to indicate the second date, particularly the date of filing of their motion for reconsideration.[17] As explicitly stated in the aforementioned Rule, failure to comply with any of the requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. The rationale for this strict provision of the Rules of Court is not difficult to appreciate. As stated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals,[18] the requirement is for purpose of determining the timeliness of the petition, thus: The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the purpose of determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution
	GR No. 139607 2002-10-28	RAMON ISIDRO P. LAPID v. EMMANUEL D. LAUREA QUISUMBING, J.
proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of these rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.[24] All told, no reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals for dismissing the petition for certiorari and later denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.