This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2013-04-11 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| It should be noted that this is merely an administrative matter, a bar matter to be specific, where technical rules are not strictly applied. In fact, in administrative cases, there is no rule regarding entry of judgment. Where there is no entry of judgment, finality and immutability do not come into play. On several occasions, the Court has re-opened administrative cases and modified its decisions that had long attained finality in the interest of justice. A recent example is Talens-Dabon v. Judge Arceo,[43] where the Court lifted the ban against the disqualification of the respondent from re-employment in government. In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency,[44] the Court granted clemency so the respondent could transfer to a higher position. In Petition for Judicial Clemency of Judge Irma Zita v. Masamayor,[45] the respondent was given judicial clemency for her past administrative offenses so she could apply for a lateral transfer. | |||||
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2013-04-11 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| In 2009, however, the national and regional IBP elections were again tainted with numerous controversies, which were resolved by the Court in its December 14, 2010 Resolution,[19] in the following manner: | |||||
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2010-08-25 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Petitioner submits that contrary to the ruling of public respondent, resolutions denying admissibility to petitioner's documentary exhibits, as well as the subject resolution denying the motion to present additional evidence, were not final orders which may no longer be disturbed. Citing the case of Looyuko v. Court of Appeals,[17] petitioner points out that before judgment is rendered and for good cause shown, the court may still allow the introduction of additional evidence, and that is still within a liberal interpretation of the period for trial. Since no judgment has yet been rendered in SB Civil Case No. 0011, the presentation of additional evidence may still be resolved by public respondent and integrated in the judgment disposing of all the claims in the said case.[18] | |||||
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2008-02-27 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| As a general rule, intervention is legally possible only "before or during a trial"; hence, a motion for intervention filed after trial - and, a fortiori, when the case has already been submitted, when judgment has been rendered, or worse, when judgment is already final and executory - should be denied.[17] The rule, however, is not without exceptions. | |||||
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2008-01-22 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| Finally, with respect to Gan's intervention, we affirm the appellate court's finding that the same is no longer proper considering that the decision in Civil Case No. 140-0-93 had become final and executory. Gan moved to intervene only in 1995, when the decision became final and executory in February 1994. Certainly, intervention, being merely collateral or ancillary to the principal action, may no longer be allowed in a case already terminated by final judgment.[17] Moreover, since Gan did not appeal the herein assailed decision of the appellate court, then the same, as against him, has become final and executory. | |||||
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2003-08-25 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| What remained with Pineda and Sayoc after the foreclosure was the mortgagor's residual rights over the foreclosed Property, which rights are the equity of redemption[31] and a share in the surplus fund, if any.[32] Since Mojica was not a purchaser in good faith, the residual rights of Mojica were subject to the claim of Pineda and Sayoc. Of course, Pineda and Sayoc may still file an action to recover the outstanding debt of the Spouses Benitez, and even go after Mojica for her assumption of obligation under the Acknowledgment of Indebtedness. | |||||