This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2012-07-04 |
SERENO, J. |
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| We have repeatedly ruled that the right to appeal is a remedy of statutory origin. As such, this right must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law authorizing its exercise.[17] The special jurisdiction of the SAC-RTC is conferred and regulated by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and appeals therefrom are governed by Section 60 thereof. That law expressly states that appeals from SACs must be taken to the Court of Appeals without making a distinction between appeals raising questions of fact and those dealing purely with questions of law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. Consequently, we rule that the only mode of appeal from decisions of the SAC-RTC is via a Rule 42 petition for review[18] to the Court of Appeals, without any distinction as to whether the appeal raises questions of fact, questions of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. | |||||
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2010-08-18 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Petitioner's claim that the issue on the admissibility of testimonies of respondent's witnesses does not call for an evaluation of evidence but a question of law as it calls for the application of the law on hearsay evidence; thus, within the remedy of a petition for certiorari is not meritorious. We find no error committed by the CA when it held that such issue was beyond the jurisdictional parameter of a special civil action of certiorari as such issue dwelt into questions of facts and evaluation of evidence. The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction and does not include a review of public respondent's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings.[28] In a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, questions of fact are generally not permitted, the inquiry being limited to whether the public respondent acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.[29] | |||||
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2009-07-23 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Since the appeal was not filed within the reglementary period of 15 days as provided by the Rules,[31] the appeal is dismissible[32] for having been filed out of time. The approval of a notice of appeal becomes the ministerial duty of the lower court, provided the appeal is filed on time. If the notice of appeal is, however, filed beyond the reglementary period, the trial court may exercise its power to refuse or disallow the same in accordance with Section 13 of Rule 41 of the Rules.[33] Let it not be overlooked that the timeliness of an appeal is a jurisdictional caveat that not even this Court can trifle with.[34] Consequently, the trial court committed no error in dismissing the appeal. | |||||
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2004-10-22 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process. It is a procedural remedy of statutory origin and, as such, may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise. Hence, its requirements must be strictly complied with.[20] Moreover, the perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is essential; noncompliance with this legal requirement is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory.[21] After a decision is declared final and executory, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to appeal within the prescribed | |||||
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2004-09-07 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| This is not the first time that petitioner has taken issue with the propriety of the CA's ruling on the merits. He raised it with the appellate court when he moved for reconsideration of its December 8, 2000 Decision. The CA even corrected itself in its November 20, 2001 Resolution, as follows: "Upon another review of the case, the Court concedes that it may indeed have lost its way and been waylaid by the variety, complexity and seeming importance of the interests and issues involved in the case below, the apparent reluctance of the judges, five in all, to hear the case, and the volume of the conflicting, often confusing, submissions bearing on incidental matters. We stand corrected."[9] That explanation should have been enough to settle the issue. The CA's Resolution on this point has rendered petitioner's issue moot. Hence, there is no need to discuss it further. Suffice it to say that the appellate court indeed acted ultra jurisdictio in ruling on the merits of the case when the only issue that could have been, and was in fact, raised was the alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court in denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Settled is the doctrine that the sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction. Such writ does not include a review of the evidence,[10] more so when no determination of the merits has yet been made by the trial court, as in this case. | |||||
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2003-08-28 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The settled rule is a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite for the filing of a petition for certiorari.[12] A petitioner must exhaust all other available remedies before resorting to certiorari. An exception to this rule arises if the petitioner raises purely legal issues. However, contrary to PILTEL's view, the issues raised in its petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals were mainly factual in nature. Since PILTEL disputes NTC's factual findings and seeks a re-evaluation of the facts and evidence on record, the issues PILTEL raised are not proper subjects for certiorari. Evidentiary matters or matters of fact raised in the NTC are not proper grounds in the proceedings for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.[13] The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction and does not include a review of the NTC's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings.[14] | |||||
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2003-06-26 |
CORONA, J. |
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| In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (Emphasis supplied) In Oro vs. Judge Diaz,[12] we held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process. Rather, it is a procedural remedy of statutory origin and, as such, may be availed only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise. We thus cannot confer on petitioners a right that the Rules of Court does not give and in fact even prohibits. | |||||