This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2011-06-15 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| In this case, as We have discussed earlier, petitioner failed to prove that the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion and that those were patently erroneous. Considering that the requisites that would justify certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order have not been complied with, the proper recourse for petitioner should have been an appeal in due course of the judgment of the trial court on the merits, incorporating the grounds for assailing the interlocutory orders. [22] The appellate court, thus, correctly cited Triplex Enterprises, Inc. v. PNB-Republic Bank and Solid Builders, Inc., penned by Chief Justice Renato Corona, which held: Certiorari as a special civil action is proper when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. The writ may be issued only where it is convincingly proved that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, or an act too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or that the trial court exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. | |||||
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2008-01-07 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on the merits, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory orders. Allowing appeals from interlocutory orders would result in the 'sorry spectacle' of a case being subject of a counterproductive ping-pong to and from the appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to have made an error in any of its interlocutory rulings. However, where the assailed interlocutory order was issued with grave abuse of discretion or patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court allows certiorari as a mode of redress.[28] | |||||
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2006-08-17 |
PUNO, J. |
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| Petitioner's contention that the SEC does not have jurisdiction to execute because once decided, the case ceases to be a "pending" case and becomes a "decided" case deserves scant attention. In the first place, we have repeatedly held that a case in which an execution has been issued is considered as still "pending" so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit.[39] Even assuming that a "decided" case pending execution can no longer be considered as "pending," it is settled that the particular words, clauses and phrases in a law should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole.[40] In this case, the word "pending" defines the phrase "cases submitted for final resolution" at the time the law took effect. Simply put, the reckoning point to determine whether a case is retained with the SEC for being a "pending case submitted for final resolution" is R.A. No. 8799's date of effectivity. Otherwise, it would be revolting to the common sense to direct the SEC to resolve said cases within one year from the enactment of the Code. Having retained its jurisdiction over the instant case pursuant to Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799, the SEC must be deemed to have the power to execute its subject decision. A long standing doctrine is that the tribunal which rendered the decision or award has a general supervisory control over the process of its execution, and this includes the power to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution.[41] | |||||
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2006-07-14 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| The second paragraph of Section 84 of the said Rules should be construed in its entirety and not in truncated parts. The particular words, clauses and phrases in the Rule should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole.[31] The segment of the second paragraph, which states that "copies of decisions and other communications shall be served on counsel," is qualified by the phrase "but receipt by either counsel or party shall be deemed to be a valid service." Thus, under the provision, valid service may be made on either the party, on his or her counsel, or both of them. The option on whom to serve a copy of the decision is lodged on the GSIS. Contrary to petitioner's allegations, the rule does not give petitioner's counsel any preference or priority in service for it to be valid. | |||||
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2005-09-30 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Since the 6 January 2000 Order is not a final order, but rather interlocutory in nature, we cannot agree with petitioners who insist that it may be assailed only through an appeal perfected within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof by respondents. It is axiomatic that an interlocutory order cannot be challenged by an appeal, but is susceptible to review only through the special civil action of certiorari.[25] The sixty (60)-day reglementary period for special civil actions under Rule 65 applies, and respondents' petition was filed with the Court of Appeals well within the period. | |||||