This case has been cited 6 times or more.
2015-12-08 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."[38] It refers particularly to "a party's personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the act being challenged, and "calls for more than just a generalized grievance."[39] | |||||
2014-09-16 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."[10] Specifically, it is "a party's personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the act being challenged, and "calls for more than just a generalized grievance."[11] However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.[12] | |||||
2014-09-16 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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We are aware of Bayan Muna v. Romulo[116] where the ponente for this court held: . . . International agreements may be in the form of (1) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification; or (2) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties. | |||||
2014-07-02 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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As the parties have correctly discerned, Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH is in the nature of an executive agreement. In Bayan Muna v. Romulo[47] (Bayan Muna) the Court defined an international agreement as one concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, "whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation,"[48] and further expounded that it may be in the form of either (a) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification; or (b) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties.[49] Examining its features, Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH between the IBRD and the Land Bank is an integral component of the Guarantee Agreement executed by the Government of the Philippines as a subject of international law possessed of a treaty-making capacity, and the IBRD, which, as an international lending institution organized by world governments to provide loans conditioned upon the guarantee of repayment by the borrowing sovereign state, is likewise regarded a subject of international law and possessed of the capacity to enter into executive agreements with sovereign states. Being similar to a treaty but without requiring legislative concurrence, Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH following the definition given in the Bayan Muna case is an executive agreement and is, thus, governed by international law.Owing to this classification, the Government of the Philippines is therefore obligated to observe its terms and conditions under the rule of pacta sunt servanda, a fundamental maxim of international law that requires the parties to keep their agreement in good faith.[50] It bears pointing out that the pacta sunt servanda rule has become part of the law of the land through the incorporation clause found under Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which states that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations."Keeping in mind the foregoing attributions, the Court now examines the SLA and its relation with Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH. | |||||
2012-02-07 |
SERENO, J. |
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In Bayan Muna v. Romulo, this Court held that an executive agreement is similar to a treaty, except that the former (a) does not require legislative concurrence; (b) is usually less formal; and (c) deals with a narrower range of subject matters.[50] | |||||
2011-08-16 |
CARPIO, J. |
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Petitioners next submit that RA 9522's use of UNCLOS III's regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial claim" over that area.[27] Petitioners add that the KIG's (and Scarborough Shoal's) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters," prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.[28] A comparison of the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis-à-vis the Philippines' obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view. |