This case has been cited 10 times or more.
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2013-07-03 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| While we agree with petitioner that in Cagayan Valley, the requisite board resolution was submitted though belatedly unlike in the instant case, this Court still recognizes the authority of Mr. Erece, Jr. to sign the verification and certification on behalf of PNCC sans a board resolution or secretary's certificate as we have allowed in Pfizer, Inc. v. Galan,[29] one of the cases cited in Cagayan Valley. In Pfizer, the Court ruled as valid the verification signed by an employment specialist as she was in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition[30] despite the fact that no board resolution authorizing her was ever submitted by Pfizer, Inc. even belatedly. We believe that like the employment specialist in Pfizer, Mr. Erece, Jr. too, as head of the Personnel Services Department of PNCC, was in a position to assure that the allegations in the pleading have been prepared in good faith and are true and correct. | |||||
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2009-07-23 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Petitioner cannot take refuge in the "fresh period rule." In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[49] the Court standardized the appeal periods provided in the rules in order to afford litigants a fair opportunity to appeal their cases. We allowed a fresh period of fifteen days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Neypes is inapplicable to the present case, although procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage; there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure,[50] said retroactive application of procedural rule does not extend to actions that have already become final and executory,[51] like the Order of the trial court in the instant case. | |||||
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2008-06-25 |
TINGA, J, |
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| The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the general rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure.[17] Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.[18] | |||||
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2006-10-11 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Time and again, we have said the lack of verification is merely a formal defect that is neither jurisdictional nor fatal. In a proper case, the court may order the correction of the pleading or act on the unverified pleading, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order to serve the ends of justice.[12] It should be stressed that rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts cannot be enslaved by technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat vis-à-vis substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within the Court's power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its operation.[13] This is more so in labor cases where social justice should be emphasized. In light of the circumstances of this case, we find that the lack of verification may be excused, so that the case could be decided on its merits. | |||||
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2005-06-08 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Concerning the verification, we note that Rosenda stated therein that she caused the preparation of the "foregoing Pre-Trial Brief" but we consider the same as a slight error and honest mistake in the preparation of the petition. In any event, the purpose of requiring a verification is simply to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely speculative.[25] This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does not necessarily render it fatally defective.[26] Indeed, verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement.[27] | |||||
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2003-03-18 |
CORONA, J. |
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| The retroactive application of A.M. 00-2-03-SC has, in fact, already been ordered by this Court in a number of recent cases, such as Systems Factors Corporation vs. NLRC, [22] Unity Fishing Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, [23] Docena et. al. vs. Lapesura, [24] Pfizer vs. Galan [25] and Universal Robina Corporation et. al. vs. Court of Appeals et. al. [26] | |||||
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2001-11-29 |
PARDO, J. |
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| Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure.[19] | |||||