This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2007-12-10 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. In People v. Kho,[4] this Court held that the foregoing Rule contemplates two kinds of inhibitions compulsory and voluntary. The first paragraph provides that compulsory disqualification conclusively presumes that the judge cannot actively or impartially sit on a case. The second paragraph, in turn, leaves to the judge's discretion whether he should desist from sitting in a case for other just and valid reasons. A judge, however, does not enjoy a wide latitude in the exercise of his discretion to inhibit himself from hearing a case, as the inhibition must be for just and valid causes.[5] | |||||
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2007-02-05 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias and partiality is not enough ground for judges to inhibit, especially when the charge is without basis. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias and partiality.[31] This Court has invariably held that for bias and prejudice to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, mere suspicion is not enough. Bare allegations of their partiality will not suffice "in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear and favor."[32] | |||||
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2006-05-05 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| This discretion granted to trial judges takes cognizance of the fact that these judges are in a better position to determine the issue of voluntary inhibition as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms.[30] Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the authority for voluntary inhibition does not give judges unlimited discretion to decide whether or not they will desist from hearing a case.[31] The decision on whether or not judges should inhibit themselves must be based on their rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the cases brought before them.[32] | |||||
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2005-01-14 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| We now come to the issue of bias and partiality. In administrative proceedings, the complainant bears the onus of establishing, by substantial evidence, the averments of his complaint.[37] Notatu dignum is the presumption of regularity in the performance of a judge's functions, hence bias, prejudice and even undue interest cannot be presumed, specially weighed against a judge's sacred allegation under oath of office to administer justice without respect to any person and do equal right to the poor and to the rich.[38] In a long line of cases decided by this Court,[39] it was held that bare allegations of bias are not enough in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. In Sinnott v. Barte,[40] it was further held, mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error that may be inferred from the decision or order itself. Although the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a case against the judge. | |||||
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2003-08-15 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. It contemplates two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. In the first paragraph, compulsory disqualification conclusively assumes that a judge cannot actively or impartially sit on a case for the reasons therein stated. The second paragraph, concerning voluntary inhibition, leaves to the judge's discretion whether he should desist from sitting in a case for other just and valid reasons with only his conscience to guide him.[24] | |||||