Lawyerly

GR No. 152375

2011-12-13

REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION)

BRION, J.

We do not find the respondents' submission meritorious. While the 1998 resolution is an interlocutory order, as correctly argued by the petitioner and impliedly conceded by the respondents, the claim that the 1998 resolution should have been immediately questioned by the petitioner on certiorari is not totally correct as a petition for certiorari is not grounded solely on the issuance of a disputed interlocutory ruling.[58] For a petition for certiorari to prosper, Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires, among others, that neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available to the aggrieved party. As a matter of exception, the writ of certiorari may issue notwithstanding the existence of an available alternative remedy, if such remedy is inadequate or insufficient in relieving the aggrieved party of the injurious effects of the order complained of.[59]

GR NO. 164934

2007-08-14

HEIRS OF FLORENCIO ADOLFO v. VICTORIA P. CABRAL

QUISUMBING, J.

An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.[18] Thus, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling.[19] It is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.[20] Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is rendered. In order to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss must have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[21]

GR NO. 172242

2007-08-14

PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD. v. DAKILA TRADING CORPORATION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Dismissal of a Complaint for failure to state a cause of action is provided for by the Rules of Court.[44] When a Motion to Dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, a ruling thereon should be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must pass upon this issue based solely on such allegations, assuming them to be true. For it to do otherwise would be a procedural error and a denial of plaintiff's right to due process.[45] While, truly, there are well-recognized exceptions[46] to the rule that the allegations are hypothetically admitted as true and inquiry is confined to the face of the complaint,[47] none of the exceptions apply in this case. Hence, the general rule applies. The defense of the petitioner that it is not the real party-in-interest is evidentiary in nature which must be proven in trial. The appellate court, then, cannot be faulted for not granting petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.

GR NO. 144568

2007-07-03

GUILLERMA S. SABLAS v. ESTERLITA S. SABLAS

CORONA, J.

In Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Hon. Romillo, Jr.,[19] the Court ruled that it was error to declare the defending party in default after the answer was filed. The Court was in fact even more emphatic in Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education:[20] it was grave abuse of discretion to declare a defending party in default despite the latter's filing of an answer.

GR NO. 170080

2007-04-03

CONSOLACION Q. AUSTRIA v. CONSUELO Q. JALANDONI

TINGA, J.

A defendant declared in default has the following remedies: (a) a motion to set aside the order of default under Sec. 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court; (b) a motion for new trial under Sec. 1(a), Rule 37 if the default was discovered after judgment but while appeal is still available; (c) a petition for relief under Rule 38 if judgment has become final and executory; and (d) an appeal from the judgment under Sec. 1, Rule 41 even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been resorted to.[8]

GR NO. 166744

2006-11-02

AC ENTERPRISES v. FRABELLE PROPERTIES CORPORATION

CALLEJO, SR., J.

The Order of the RTC dated September 15, 2003 denying the motion to dismiss of petitioner (as defendant below) is interlocutory in nature. The general rule is that an order denying a motion to dismiss a complaint cannot be questioned via a special civil action for certiorari until a final judgment on the merits of the case is rendered. A party must exhaust all remedies available before resorting to certiorari. A writ for certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling. It is resorted only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It is a remedy narrow in scope, limited only to keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts which courts have no power or authority to perform.[29] The remedy of petitioner was to go to trial and appeal from an adverse decision.

GR NO. 160895

2006-10-30

JOSE R. MARTINEZ v. REPUBLIC

TINGA, J.

d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)[31] The fourth remedy, that of appeal, is anchored on Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules. Yet even after that provision's deletion under the 1997 Rules, the Court did not hesitate to expressly rely again on the Lina doctrine, including the pronouncement that a defaulted defendant may appeal from the judgment rendered against him. This can be seen in the cases of Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education,[32] Tan v. Dumarpa,[33] and Crisologo v. Globe Telecom, Inc.[34]

GR NO. 153696

2006-09-11

SPS. HUMBERTO DELOS SANTOS AND CARMENCITA DELOS SANTOS v. EMMANUEL C. CARPIO

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

In a case,[16] we found the trial court to have gravely abused its discretion when it declared defendants in default; that the answer should be admitted because it had been filed before it was declared in default and no prejudice was caused to plaintiff; and that the hornbook rule is that default judgments are generally disfavored.[17]

GR NO. 167399

2006-06-22

ERNESTINA L. CRISOLOGO-JOSE v. LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES

GARCIA, J.

The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other pleading to be filed after the time fixed by these Rules. (Emphasis added.) And as Indiana Aerospace University vs. Commission on Higher Education[8] teaches, an answer should be admitted where it had been filed before the defendant was declared in default and no prejudice is caused to the plaintiff, as here. Indeed, petitioner has not demonstrated how the admission by the trial court of respondent's answer was prejudicial to her case which, at bottom, involves only the determination of the fair market value of her property.

GR NO. 142272

2006-05-02

ABOITIZ INTERNATIONAL FORWARDERS v. CA

CALLEJO, SR., J.

Even on the assumption that the court a quo had no jurisdiction over petitioner AIFI on account of the non-service on it of the summons and complaint, the remedy of petitioner AIFI from notice of the decision by default on July 24, 1996 was to file a motion for the reconsideration of said decision or for new trial within fifteen days from said date. This is without prejudice to its right to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of the order of default of the court a quo and the proceedings thereafter held including its decision, the writ of execution and the writ of garnishment issued by the court a quo on the ground that it acted without jurisdiction.[24] However, petitioner AIFI opted to file a petition for relief from judgment of the court a quo.

GR NO. 156887

2005-10-03

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. AMALIA F. DY IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC MANDALUYONG CITY

AZCUNA, J.

It is generally recognized that a special civil action is not the proper remedy to assail a denial of a motion to dismiss. The order of the trial court denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory which does not terminate nor finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.[12] The proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered. Certiorari is resorted to only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[13] Ordinary error would not be enough.

GR No. 138777

2004-09-22

JOY G. TAN v. SALIC B. DUMARPA

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

In Indiana Aerospace University vs. Commission on Higher Education,[6] we held: "The remedies available to a defendant declared in default are as follows: (a) a motion to set aside the order of default under Section 3 (b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, if the default was discovered before judgment could be rendered; (2) a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37, if the default was discovered after judgment but while appeal is still available; (3) a petition for relief under Rule 38, if judgment has become final and executory; and (4) an appeal from the judgment under Section 1, Rule 41, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been resorted to." Here, petitioner came to know of the Judgment by Default after it was promulgated by the trial court while appeal was still available. In fact, she filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Thereafter, what she should have done pursuant to the Rules, was to file with the trial court a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal[7] with the Court of Appeals. Instead, she came directly to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari.

GR No. 152947

2004-07-07

EAST ASIA TRADERS v. REPUBLIC

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

In Indiana Aerospace University vs. Commission on Higher Education,[8] we held: "An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and so the proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered. A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling; it is resorted only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Its function is limited to keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts acts which courts or judges have no power or authority in law to perform. It is not designed to correct erroneous findings and conclusions made by the courts." Assuming that certiorari is the proper remedy, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. In the same vein, the Court of Appeals did not err in upholding the assailed RTC Order denying the motion to dismiss reproduced below: "After a careful examination of the records of this case, as well as the contentions of both parties, the court finds no merit to the instant motion to dismiss.

GR No. 143556

2004-03-16

EQUITABLE PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK v. CA

QUISUMBING, J.

the order was received by Lota only on October 27, 1993. Hence, for refusing to allow the withdrawal of funds deposited with petitioners, Sta. Rosa avers that its joint venture agreement with Sa Amin was prejudiced and they failed to realize the expected profits. When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, a ruling thereon should be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint.[17] The rule is that only the allegations in the complaint may properly be considered in

GR No. 147999

2004-02-27

SUI MAN HUI CHAN v. CA

QUISUMBING, J.

The Court of Appeals stated that the grant or denial of a Motion to Dismiss is an interlocutory order, and it cannot be the proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari. The proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered, the CA said. A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling; it is resorted to only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The function of a petition for certiorari is limited to keeping an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts, acts which courts or judges have no power or authority in law to perform. Certiorari is not designed to correct erroneous findings and conclusions made by the court.[10] On this score, we are in agreement with the appellate court.

GR No. 159139

2004-01-13

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC

PANGANIBAN, J.

"4. Instant Petition is not premature. Direct resort to the Supreme Court is justified."[17]

GR No. 147096

2002-01-15

REPUBLIC v. EXPRESS TELECOMMUNICATION CO.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

The general rule is that, in order to give the lower court the opportunity to correct itself, a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to certiorari. It also basic that petitioner must exhaust all other available remedies before resorting to certiorari. This rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions such as any of the following: (1) the issues raised are purely legal in nature, (2) public interest is involved, (3) extreme urgency is obvious or (4) special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action.[40] This case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to this rule. Although the Order of the NTC dated May 3, 2000 granting provisional authority to Bayantel was immediately executory, it did not preclude the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Under the NTC Rules, a party adversely affected by a decision, order, ruling or resolution may within fifteen (15) days file a motion for reconsideration. That the Order of the NTC became immediately executory does not mean that the remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration is foreclosed to the petitioner.[41]

	GR No. 152375 2011-12-13	REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) BRION, J.
We do not find the respondents' submission meritorious. While the 1998 resolution is an interlocutory order, as correctly argued by the petitioner and impliedly conceded by the respondents, the claim that the 1998 resolution should have been immediately questioned by the petitioner on certiorari is not totally correct as a petition for certiorari is not grounded solely on the issuance of a disputed interlocutory ruling.[58] For a petition for certiorari to prosper, Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires, among others, that neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available to the aggrieved party. As a matter of exception, the writ of certiorari may issue notwithstanding the existence of an available alternative remedy, if such remedy is inadequate or insufficient in relieving the aggrieved party of the injurious effects of the order complained of.[59]
	GR NO. 164934 2007-08-14	HEIRS OF FLORENCIO ADOLFO v. VICTORIA P. CABRAL QUISUMBING, J.
An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.[18] Thus, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling.[19] It is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.[20] Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is rendered. In order to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss must have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[21]
	GR NO. 172242 2007-08-14	PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD. v. DAKILA TRADING CORPORATION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Dismissal of a Complaint for failure to state a cause of action is provided for by the Rules of Court.[44] When a Motion to Dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, a ruling thereon should be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must pass upon this issue based solely on such allegations, assuming them to be true. For it to do otherwise would be a procedural error and a denial of plaintiff's right to due process.[45] While, truly, there are well-recognized exceptions[46] to the rule that the allegations are hypothetically admitted as true and inquiry is confined to the face of the complaint,[47] none of the exceptions apply in this case. Hence, the general rule applies. The defense of the petitioner that it is not the real party-in-interest is evidentiary in nature which must be proven in trial. The appellate court, then, cannot be faulted for not granting petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
	GR NO. 144568 2007-07-03	GUILLERMA S. SABLAS v. ESTERLITA S. SABLAS CORONA, J.
In Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Hon. Romillo, Jr.,[19] the Court ruled that it was error to declare the defending party in default after the answer was filed. The Court was in fact even more emphatic in Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education:[20] it was grave abuse of discretion to declare a defending party in default despite the latter's filing of an answer.
	GR NO. 170080 2007-04-03	CONSOLACION Q. AUSTRIA v. CONSUELO Q. JALANDONI TINGA, J.
A defendant declared in default has the following remedies: (a) a motion to set aside the order of default under Sec. 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court; (b) a motion for new trial under Sec. 1(a), Rule 37 if the default was discovered after judgment but while appeal is still available; (c) a petition for relief under Rule 38 if judgment has become final and executory; and (d) an appeal from the judgment under Sec. 1, Rule 41 even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been resorted to.[8]
	GR NO. 166744 2006-11-02	AC ENTERPRISES v. FRABELLE PROPERTIES CORPORATION CALLEJO, SR., J.
The Order of the RTC dated September 15, 2003 denying the motion to dismiss of petitioner (as defendant below) is interlocutory in nature. The general rule is that an order denying a motion to dismiss a complaint cannot be questioned via a special civil action for certiorari until a final judgment on the merits of the case is rendered. A party must exhaust all remedies available before resorting to certiorari. A writ for certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling. It is resorted only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It is a remedy narrow in scope, limited only to keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts which courts have no power or authority to perform.[29] The remedy of petitioner was to go to trial and appeal from an adverse decision.
	GR NO. 160895 2006-10-30	JOSE R. MARTINEZ v. REPUBLIC TINGA, J.
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)[31] The fourth remedy, that of appeal, is anchored on Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules. Yet even after that provision's deletion under the 1997 Rules, the Court did not hesitate to expressly rely again on the Lina doctrine, including the pronouncement that a defaulted defendant may appeal from the judgment rendered against him. This can be seen in the cases of Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education,[32] Tan v. Dumarpa,[33] and Crisologo v. Globe Telecom, Inc.[34]
	GR NO. 153696 2006-09-11	SPS. HUMBERTO DELOS SANTOS AND CARMENCITA DELOS SANTOS v. EMMANUEL C. CARPIO AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In a case,[16] we found the trial court to have gravely abused its discretion when it declared defendants in default; that the answer should be admitted because it had been filed before it was declared in default and no prejudice was caused to plaintiff; and that the hornbook rule is that default judgments are generally disfavored.[17]
	GR NO. 167399 2006-06-22	ERNESTINA L. CRISOLOGO-JOSE v. LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES GARCIA, J.
The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other pleading to be filed after the time fixed by these Rules. (Emphasis added.) And as Indiana Aerospace University vs. Commission on Higher Education[8] teaches, an answer should be admitted where it had been filed before the defendant was declared in default and no prejudice is caused to the plaintiff, as here. Indeed, petitioner has not demonstrated how the admission by the trial court of respondent's answer was prejudicial to her case which, at bottom, involves only the determination of the fair market value of her property.
	GR NO. 142272 2006-05-02	ABOITIZ INTERNATIONAL FORWARDERS v. CA CALLEJO, SR., J.
Even on the assumption that the court a quo had no jurisdiction over petitioner AIFI on account of the non-service on it of the summons and complaint, the remedy of petitioner AIFI from notice of the decision by default on July 24, 1996 was to file a motion for the reconsideration of said decision or for new trial within fifteen days from said date. This is without prejudice to its right to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of the order of default of the court a quo and the proceedings thereafter held including its decision, the writ of execution and the writ of garnishment issued by the court a quo on the ground that it acted without jurisdiction.[24] However, petitioner AIFI opted to file a petition for relief from judgment of the court a quo.
	GR NO. 156887 2005-10-03	PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. AMALIA F. DY IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC MANDALUYONG CITY AZCUNA, J.
It is generally recognized that a special civil action is not the proper remedy to assail a denial of a motion to dismiss. The order of the trial court denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory which does not terminate nor finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.[12] The proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered. Certiorari is resorted to only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[13] Ordinary error would not be enough.
	GR No. 138777 2004-09-22	JOY G. TAN v. SALIC B. DUMARPA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
In Indiana Aerospace University vs. Commission on Higher Education,[6] we held: "The remedies available to a defendant declared in default are as follows: (a) a motion to set aside the order of default under Section 3 (b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, if the default was discovered before judgment could be rendered; (2) a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37, if the default was discovered after judgment but while appeal is still available; (3) a petition for relief under Rule 38, if judgment has become final and executory; and (4) an appeal from the judgment under Section 1, Rule 41, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been resorted to." Here, petitioner came to know of the Judgment by Default after it was promulgated by the trial court while appeal was still available. In fact, she filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Thereafter, what she should have done pursuant to the Rules, was to file with the trial court a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal[7] with the Court of Appeals. Instead, she came directly to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari.
	GR No. 152947 2004-07-07	EAST ASIA TRADERS v. REPUBLIC SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
In Indiana Aerospace University vs. Commission on Higher Education,[8] we held: "An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and so the proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered. A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling; it is resorted only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Its function is limited to keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts acts which courts or judges have no power or authority in law to perform. It is not designed to correct erroneous findings and conclusions made by the courts." Assuming that certiorari is the proper remedy, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. In the same vein, the Court of Appeals did not err in upholding the assailed RTC Order denying the motion to dismiss reproduced below: "After a careful examination of the records of this case, as well as the contentions of both parties, the court finds no merit to the instant motion to dismiss.
	GR No. 143556 2004-03-16	EQUITABLE PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK v. CA QUISUMBING, J.
the order was received by Lota only on October 27, 1993. Hence, for refusing to allow the withdrawal of funds deposited with petitioners, Sta. Rosa avers that its joint venture agreement with Sa Amin was prejudiced and they failed to realize the expected profits. When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, a ruling thereon should be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint.[17] The rule is that only the allegations in the complaint may properly be considered in
	GR No. 147999 2004-02-27	SUI MAN HUI CHAN v. CA QUISUMBING, J.
The Court of Appeals stated that the grant or denial of a Motion to Dismiss is an interlocutory order, and it cannot be the proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari. The proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered, the CA said. A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling; it is resorted to only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The function of a petition for certiorari is limited to keeping an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts, acts which courts or judges have no power or authority in law to perform. Certiorari is not designed to correct erroneous findings and conclusions made by the court.[10] On this score, we are in agreement with the appellate court.
	GR No. 159139 2004-01-13	INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC PANGANIBAN, J.
"4. Instant Petition is not premature. Direct resort to the Supreme Court is justified."[17]
	GR No. 147096 2002-01-15	REPUBLIC v. EXPRESS TELECOMMUNICATION CO. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
The general rule is that, in order to give the lower court the opportunity to correct itself, a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to certiorari. It also basic that petitioner must exhaust all other available remedies before resorting to certiorari. This rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions such as any of the following: (1) the issues raised are purely legal in nature, (2) public interest is involved, (3) extreme urgency is obvious or (4) special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action.[40] This case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to this rule. Although the Order of the NTC dated May 3, 2000 granting provisional authority to Bayantel was immediately executory, it did not preclude the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Under the NTC Rules, a party adversely affected by a decision, order, ruling or resolution may within fifteen (15) days file a motion for reconsideration. That the Order of the NTC became immediately executory does not mean that the remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration is foreclosed to the petitioner.[41]

INDIANA AEROSPACE UNIVERSITY v. COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION