This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2012-11-12 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The CA held the testimonies of petitioner's witnesses insufficient to establish Dominic's psychological affliction to be of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted. Relying on the pronouncements in Republic v. Dagdag,[13] Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[14] and Pesca v. Pesca,[15] the CA observed: In her testimony, petitioner described her husband as immature, deceitful and without remorse for his dishonesty, and lack of affection. Such characteristics, however, do not necessarily constitute a case of psychological incapacity. A person's inability to share or take responsibility, or to feel remorse for his misbehavior, or even to share his earnings with family members, are indicative of an immature mind, but not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that cannot be cured. | |||||
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2007-08-02 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| Significantly, the present case is exactly akin to Pesca v. Pesca.[48] Pesca stemmed from a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 filed by a battered wife sometime in April 1994. The trial court, in its Decision dated November 15, 1995, decreed the marriage void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's Decision, applying the Guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals[49] and Molina.[50] When the matter was brought to this Court, the wife argued that Santos and Molina should not have retroactive application, the Guidelines being merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. She submitted that the proper application of Santos and Molina warranted only a remand of her case to the trial court for further proceedings, not a dismissal. The Court declined to remand Pesca[51] on the premise that the Santos and Molina Guidelines "constitute a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted," thus:The 'doctrine of stare decisis,' ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim - 'legis interpretado legis vim obtinet' that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of 'lex prospicit, non replicit.' | |||||
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2004-09-29 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the February 28, 2001 Decision[2] and the October 30, 2001 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA GR CR No. 18759. The CA affirmed, with modifications, the March 8, 1995 judgment[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)[5] of Iloilo City (Branch 25) in Criminal Case No. 36921, finding Roweno Pomoy guilty of the crime of homicide. The assailed CA Decision disposed as follows: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, MODIFIED as to penalty in the sense that the [Petitioner] ROWENO POMOY is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects."[6] The challenged CA Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. | |||||
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2004-01-29 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| Respondent's sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity.[15] It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity[16] or sexual promiscuity. | |||||
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2003-09-24 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Molina additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity.[14] | |||||