This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2008-01-31 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| It has been held that "[a]n interlocutory order does not terminate or finally dismiss or finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits." It "refers to something between the commencement and end of the suit which decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision on the whole controversy." Conversely, a final order is one which leaves to the court nothing more to do to resolve the case. The test to ascertain whether an order is interlocutory or final is: "Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final."[62] TCSI argues that since the trial court still has to hear the issue on damages in Civil Case No. 03-0025 for mandamus and no final decision has yet been rendered, the mandamus writ is an interlocutory one, and cannot be subject of an appeal. However, Rule 41 clearly states that while an interlocutory order cannot be subject of an appeal and the aggrieved party has to await the decision of the court, still it allows the filing of a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 when there is grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the order. Moreover, under the circumstances of the case, MIAA had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy other than a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. | |||||
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2006-10-30 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The central question, as posed by Martinez, is whether the OSG could have still appealed the RTC decision after it had been declared in default. The OSG argues that a party in default is not precluded from filing an appeal, citing Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals,[14] and asserts that "[t]he Rules of Court expressly provides that a party who has been declared in default may appeal from the judgment rendered against him."[15] | |||||