This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2007-06-26 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional.[14] The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.[15] It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.[16] | |||||
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2002-07-16 |
KAPUNAN, J. |
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| legal spouse by a previous marriage."[46] Corollarily, as used in the law defining and penalizing the crime of rape, a "stepfather" is the legal husband of the victim's mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the victim is the offspring.[47] The allegation that appellant was complainant's stepfather is belied by Julia Fernandez's testimony that she was not married to appellant and that she was only living in with him.[48] Appellant also testified that he was married to a certain Arsenia | |||||
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2001-10-26 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In People vs. Amadore, we held that the attendance of any of the circumstances under the provisions of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, mandating the death penalty are in the nature of qualifying circumstances and the absence of proper averment thereof in the complaint will bar the imposition of that extreme penalty.[28] The information in this case did not allege the qualifying circumstance, that the rape was committed in full view of a niece (a relative within the third degree of consanguinity). Because of this deficiency, appellant was not properly apprised of the extent of the punishment which the charges against him entailed. Thus, it was an error to consider the foregoing circumstance in the imposition of the proper penalty on appellant. | |||||