This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2008-02-26 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| More importantly, appellant himself readily admitted that the letter is the same letter he wrote for AAA.[46] He also confirmed that the handwriting therein is his.[47] Although later, he would deny the same on the basis that he does not use the Marlboro cigarette brand, but only Winston cigarette brand,[48] we still give more weight to his admission of the said letter since it was given voluntarily and spontaneously. His subsequent denial is not only based on flimsy grounds but also an obvious attempt to cover-up his earlier damaging testimony. As to the contents of the letter, verily, no one would ask for forgiveness unless he has committed a wrong and a plea for forgiveness may be considered analogous to an attempt to compromise, which offer of compromise by the appellant may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt pursuant to Section 27, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.[49] | |||||
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2004-12-10 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| On October 13, 2000, petitioner filed a complaint[3] against respondents Willibaldo Uy (Uy), Chua Ping Hian (Chua) and the latter's agent, Laureana P. Borres (Borres). She alleged that on three separate occasions, she obtained loans from Chua in the total amount of P5.5 million. As security for said loans, she executed a real estate mortgage over a lot[4] covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 124391, registered in her name and located at No. 1661, Evangelista St., Bangkal, Makati City. Before the third loan could be released, she signed a deed of absolute sale conveying the lot in favor of Chua in consideration of the amount of P3 Million[5] upon the assurance of Borres that the deed was a mere formality. On November 9, 1995, however, she learned that her title over the property was cancelled and that a new one was issued on November 8, 1995 in the name of Chua. | |||||
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2001-09-26 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman by force or intimidation and against her will or without her consent.[7] What consummates the felony is penile contact, however slight, with the labia of the victim's vagina without her consent. Consequently, it is not required that lacerations be found on the private complainant's hymen. Nor is it necessary to show that the victim had a reddening of the external genitalia or sustained a hematoma on other parts of her body to sustain the possibility of a rape charge. For it is well-settled that the absence of external injuries does not negate rape.[8] This is because in rape, the important consideration is not the presence of injuries on the victim's body, but penile contact with the female genitalia without the woman's consent. Hence, appellant's reliance upon the findings of Dr. Renato Armada, who testified that he examined Evelyn and found no lacerations or hematoma in any part of her body could not prevail over the positive testimony of the offended party and her witnesses that she was sexually abused. | |||||
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2000-10-11 |
PARDO, J. |
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| Neither can the commission of the rape be negated by the fact that it was perpetrated within the well-lighted bus terminal premises where people usually gather. The presence of people in a certain place is no guarantee that rape will not and cannot be committed.[15] For rape to be committed, it is not necessary for the place to be ideal, or the weather to be fine, for rapists bear no respect for locale and time when they carry out their evil deed.[16] | |||||