This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2004-06-23 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Secondly, appellant claims that he could not have raped Rhea because she was then sleeping beside her mother, grandmother and two brothers in one room. If indeed he carried her from that room to another room and raped her, they could have awakened. It is not really impossible to commit rape under such a situation. In our judicial experience, we observed that lust is no respecter of time and place.[18] Rape incidents are not always committed in seclusion as the rapists are not deterred from committing their odious act even in unlikely places, such as in a nearby room, as in this case, or in a cramped room where other family members also slept.[19] | |||||
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2004-06-03 |
PER CURIAM |
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| It is not strange for appellant to have committed rape in a small room. In the many rape cases that have reached this Court, we observed that rape is not always committed in seclusion.[47] We never cease to be appalled at the extreme depravity of the rapists who are not deterred from committing their odious act even in unlikely places such as a cramped room where other family members also slept.[48] Rape may take only a short time to consummate, given the anxiety and high risk of being caught, especially when committed near sleeping persons oblivious to the goings-on.[49] Indeed, lust is no respecter of time or place.[50] | |||||
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2003-12-11 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Nevertheless, the death penalty is not the correct penalty for the rape committed by appellant because the information filed against him failed to state his relationship with Elma Luna. To justify imposing the death penalty, the information must specifically allege the qualifying circumstances of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender, and the prosecution must prove during the trial these attendant circumstances.[17] While the prosecution did prove that appellant was the common-law spouse of Elma Luna's mother, the information failed to allege such fact. The Court has consistently held that where the information merely alleged the minority of the victim but not the fact of relationship with the accused, the latter is liable only for simple rape punishable with reclusion perpetua.[18] This is to comply with the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.[19] | |||||
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2001-07-18 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| Time and time again the Court has held that appellate courts will not disturb the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses by the trial court because, having observed their deportment and manner of testifying, it was in a better position to weigh conflicting testimonies. This rule stands, unless the trial judge overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.[20] We do not find any exceptions here to justify a deviation from the general rule. | |||||
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2001-04-03 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Accordingly, accused-appellant should be sentenced to the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua, not because of technicality but because of his basic right to due process as guaranteed by the Constitution.[23] Simple rape is punishable only with reclusion perpetua,[24] which is imposed regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance.[25] In addition, though several rapes were proven during trial, only one conviction can prosper since only one rape is charged in the information;[26] namely, the one committed on May 27, 1996. | |||||
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2001-03-01 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| As in most rape cases, accused-appellant assails the credibility of the victim. However, we have consistently held that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of complainant's testimony is entitled to great weight, absent any showing that some facts were overlooked which, if considered, would affect the outcome of the case.[42] | |||||
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2001-02-19 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Accused-appellant basically seeks to discredit the testimony of the victim. This Court has, however, remained steadfast to the rule that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of complainant's testimony is entitled to great weight, absent any showing that some facts were overlooked which, if considered, would affect the outcome of the case.[17] Guided by the foregoing principles, the Court has meticulously scrutinized the testimony of complaining witness Angela Queigan and ultimately reached the conclusion that the acts charged did in fact occur. Thirteen-year old Angela's testimony on the acts of rape perpetrated against her by her father is clear and could have only been narrated by a victim subjected to such sexual assaults. Indeed, the enormity of accused-appellant's bestiality is graphically detailed in the following sickening account of the victim: Q Now what happened on July 2, 1996? A During the night of July 2, 1996 this is what happened. I was surprised when my father lied (sic) beside me. | |||||
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2000-10-05 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Accused-appellant basically seeks to discredit the testimony of the victim. This Court has, however, remained steadfast to the rule that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of complainant's testimony is entitled to great weight, absent any showing that some facts were overlooked which, if considered, would affect the outcome of the case.[26] Guided by the foregoing principles, the Court has meticulously scrutinized the testimony of complaining witness Myrna Bawang and ultimately reached the conclusion that the acts charged did in fact occur. Fourteen-year old Myrna's testimony on the acts of rape perpetrated against her by her father is clear and could have only been narrated by a victim subjected to such a sexual assault. Indeed, the accused-appellant's bestiality is detailed in the following narration of the victim: Q: What happened when you went to the creek to wash cloth[e]s last year? A: He ordered me to wash cloth[e]s then he followed up, sir. | |||||