This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2014-12-03 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| (3) Appear in any court in any action involving the validity of any treaty, law, executive order or proclamation, rule or regulation when in his judgment his intervention is necessary or when requested by the Court. In Gonzales vs. Chavez, the Supreme Court has said that, from the historical and statutory perspectives, the Solicitor General is the "principal law officer and legal defender of the government."[73] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted) | |||||
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2014-11-11 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| This is a consolidation of six petitions for review of several decisions of the Court of Appeals, involving three cigarette manufacturers and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. G.R. No. 125346 is an appeal[5] from the Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) that reversed[6] the Court of Tax Appeals' decision[7] and held petitioner La Suerte Cigar & Cigarette Factory (La Suerte) liable for deficiency specific tax on its purchase of imported and locally produced stemmed leaf tobacco and sale of stemmed leaf tobacco to Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation (AATC) during the period from January 1, 1986 to June 30, 1989. G.R. Nos. 136328 29 is an appeal[8] by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) from the decision[9] of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the Court of Tax Appeals' rulings[10] that Fortune Tobacco Corporation (Fortune) was not obliged to pay the excise tax on its importations of stemmed leaf tobacco for the periods from January 1, 1986 to June 30, 1989 and July 1, 1989 to November 30, 1990. In G.R. No. 148605, Sterling Tobacco Corporation (Sterling) appeals[11] the decision[12] of the Court of Appeals that reversed the Court of Tax Appeals' decision[13] and held it liable to pay deficiency excise taxes on its importation and local purchases of stemmed leaf tobacco from November 1986 to June 24, 1989. G.R. No. 144942 is an appeal[14] from the Court of Appeals' decision[15] that affirmed the Court of Tax Appeals' decision[16] and ordered the refund of specific taxes paid by La Suerte on its importation of stemmed leaf tobacco in April 1995. In G.R. No. 158197, La Suerte sought to appeal[17] the decision[18] of the Court of Appeals holding it liable for deficiency specific tax on its local and imported purchases of stemmed leaf tobacco and those it sold for the period from June 21, 1989 to November 20, 1990. Finally, in G.R. No. 165499, La Suerte again sought to appeal by certiorari[19] the decision[20] of the Court of Appeals reversing the Court of Tax Appeals and holding it liable for deficiency specific tax on its importation of stemmed leaf tobacco in March 1995. | |||||
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2014-11-11 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| In April 1995, "[La Suerte] imported stemmed leaf tobacco from various sellers abroad."[73] The Commissioner "assessed specific taxes on the stemmed leaf tobacco in the amount of P175,909.50, which [La Suerte] paid under protest."[74] "Consequently, [La Suerte] filed a claim for refund with [the Commissioner], [who] failed to act on the same."[75] Undeterred, La Suerte appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals, which in its March 9, 1999 decision, ruled in its favor. | |||||
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2014-11-11 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| Finally, La Suerte and Sterling[136] argues that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in ignoring Section 43 of RR No. 17-67, December 12, 1972 Bureau of Internal Revenue ruling and other Bureau of Internal Revenue opinions confirming the exemption of stemmed leaf tobacco from prepayment of specific tax;[137] (2) in disregarding the Bureau of Internal Revenue's practice for over half a century of not subjecting stemmed leaf tobacco to specific tax;[138] (3) in failing to consider that the re-enactment of the 1939 Tax Code as the 1977 and 1986 Tax Codes impliedly adopted the interpretation in the December 12, 1972 ruling; and 4) in holding that non-application of the December 12, 1972 ruling did not impinge on the principle of non-retroactivity of rulings.[139] Moreover, it argues that the Tax Code does not authorize collection of specific tax from buyers without a prior attempt to collect tax from manufacturers.[140] | |||||
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2014-11-11 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| Stemmed leaf tobacco is subject to the specific tax under Section 141(b). It is a partially prepared tobacco. The removal of the stem or midrib from the leaf tobacco makes the resulting stemmed leaf tobacco a prepared or partially prepared tobacco. The following is La Suerte's own illustration of how the stemmed leaf tobacco comes about: In the process of removing the stems, the whole leaf tobacco breaks into pieces; after the stems or midribs are removed, the tobacco is threshed (cut by machine into fine narrow strips) and then undergoes a process of redrying,[160] undoubtedly showing that stemmed leaf tobacco is a partially prepared tobacco. | |||||
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2007-06-19 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| As to the contention of petitioner that the CA should not have taken cognizance of the petition for review because it was not verified, as required by the Rules, this Court has held in a number of instances that such a deficiency can be excused or dispensed with in meritorious cases, the defect being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal.[19] The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal.[20] Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, the non-compliance with which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.[21] Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith.[22] The court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.[23] | |||||
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2004-12-17 |
TINGA, J. |
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| government in appellate proceedings.[5] The Court, in Gonzales v. Chavez,[6] traced extensively the statutory history of the OSG, which has existed in this jurisdiction as far back as 1901[7]. Currently, the powers and functions of the OSG are defined under | |||||
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2004-12-17 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Code pertaining to the mandate of the Office of the Solicitor General, to "represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof. " Clearly, Section 35 finds more specific application in this case than Section 16(3), as the former pointedly governs the procedure pertinent to the representation of "the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court," "in all civil actions and special proceedings." Section 35 is also consistent with precedents and the established rule that it is the Solicitor General who has the primary responsibility to appear for the government in appellate proceedings.[11] Where there is a particular or special provision and a general provision in the same statute and the latter in its most comprehensive sense would overrule the former, the particular or special provision must be operative and the general provision must be taken to affect only the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply.[12] In this way, all the provisions are given effect.[13] Moreover, the Court has already ruled on a similar argument before in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory,[14] which was previously cited in the assailed Resolution. In that case, the Commissioner of | |||||
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2004-06-30 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Instead, the CSC, using its own lawyers, filed the wrong mode of review. The CSC's assertion as to the capacity of its Office of Legal Affairs to appear before this Court is of dubious legal basis. A similar issue was raised, albeit pertaining to the legal officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in the Court's Resolution in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory.[19] The BIR therein asserted that on the basis of Section 220 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997, its legal officers were allowed to institute civil and criminal actions and proceedings in behalf of the government. The Court disagreed, saying that it is the Solicitor General who has the primary responsibility to appear for the government in appellate proceedings,[20] it being the principal law officer and legal defender of the government.[21] The Court also cited with approval, the exception enunciated in Orbos v. Civil Service Commission[22] which is that the government office may appear in its own behalf through its legal personnel or representative only if it is adversely affected by the contrary position taken by the OSG. Herein, there is no indication that the OSG has adopted a position contrary to that of the CSC; hence, appearance by the CSC on its own behalf would not be warranted. | |||||