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ESTEBAN YAU v. MANILA BANKING CORPORATION

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

	GR No. 207443 2014-07-23	GENATO INVESTMENTS v. JUDGE OSCAR P. BARRIENTOS PEREZ, J.
The principle we laid down in Estate of the late Mercedes Jacob v. Court of Appeals is not applicable. We disagree with the reasoning of the CA and respondents that petitioner in this particular case should have filed either an action for reconveyance or annulment of the auction sale, because to do so would have required the court hearing the action to modify or interfere with the judgment or order of another co-equal court, especially in this case where the said judgment or order had attained finality. Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that a court has no power to do so, as that action may lead to confusion and seriously hinder the administration of justice.[30]
	AM No. RTJ-09-2170 2009-12-16	HEIRS OF SIMEON PIEDAD v. EXECUTIVE JUDGE CESAR O. ESTRERA VELASCO JR., J.
...[J]urisdiction is vested in the court not in any particular branch or judge, and as a corollary rule, the various branches of the Court of First Instance of a judicial district are a coordinate and co-equal courts one branch stands on the same level as the other. Undue interference by one on the proceedings and processes of another is prohibited by law. In the language of this Court, the various branches of the Court of First Instance of a province or city, having as they have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments. It cannot be gainsaid that adherence to a different rule would sow confusion and wreak havoc on the orderly administration of justice, and in the ensuing melee, hapless litigants will be at a loss as to where to appear and plead their cause.[21]
	GR No. 160280 2009-03-13	SOFIA ANIOSA SALANDANAN v. SPS. MA. ISABEL AND BAYANI MENDEZ AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
As a rule, intervention is allowed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. After the lapse of this period, it will not be warranted anymore because intervention is not an independent action but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing litigation.[19] The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the Rules to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the same,[20] but under Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, the courts are nevertheless mandated to consider several factors in determining whether or not to allow intervention. The factors that should be reckoned are whether intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
	GR No. 175460 2008-04-14	METRO TRANSIT ORGANIZATION v. PIGLAS NFWU-KMU CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In the case at bar, petitioners directly went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari without filing a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC. The motion for reconsideration would have aptly furnished a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. As a rule, the Court of Appeals, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, will not take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, unless the lower court has been given the opportunity to correct the error imputed to it.[16] The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration against the assailed Resolution of the NLRC rendered its petition for certiorari before the appellate court as fatally defective.
	GR NO. 139658 2005-06-21	PO3 WILLIAM M. MENDOZA v. NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
The importance of a motion for reconsideration cannot be overemphasized. We have held that such motion is a "plain," "speedy," and "adequate remedy" in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.[5] The filing of a motion for reconsideration will give the court the opportunity to either (a) correct the error/s imputed to it or (b) clarify and strengthened its ruling on the issue and hopefully convince the movant of his wrong position. In either case, the controversy ends right there, thus preventing unnecessary and premature resort to appellate proceedings.[6] Consequently, we cannot countenance petitioner's disregard of this procedural norm and frustrate its purpose of attaining speedy, inexpensive, and orderly judicial proceedings.
	GR NO. 141796 2005-06-15	REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
As a rule, the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, lies only when the lower court has been given the opportunity to correct the error imputed to it through a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order or resolution.[15] The rationale of the rule rests upon the presumption that the court or administrative body which issued the assailed order or resolution may amend the same, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error. The motion for reconsideration, therefore, is a condition sine qua non before filing a petition for certiorari.[16]
	GR NO. 159022 2005-02-23	MAYOR EDGARDO G. FLORES v. SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF PAMPANGA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
The administrative complaint against petitioner was filed with respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga in accordance with the above provision. After receiving the Order of respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan preventively suspending him from office, petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration in order to give the latter the opportunity to correct itself if there was any error on its part. Such motion is a condition sine qua non before filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.[5] Section 1 of the same Rule requires that petitioner must not only show that respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan, in issuing the questioned Order, "acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," but that "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."[6] We have held that the "plain" and "adequate remedy" referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order or Resolution.[7] Petitioner may not arrogate to himself the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not.[8] To dispense with the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner must show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so.[9] This, petitioner failed to do. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly held that petitioner should have first interposed a motion for reconsideration of the questioned Order issued by respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan.