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EUFROCINO M. CODILLA v. JOSE DE VENECIA

This case has been cited 8 times or more.

	GR No. 206666 2015-01-21	ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL v. COMELEC LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Part and parcel of the topic "RPC Perspectives" is the position that J. Leonen took in Monsanto in the course of repudiating Cristobal v. Labrador,[83] Pelobello v. Palatino[84] and Ex Parte Garland.[85] J. Leonen took notice of the statement in Monsanto that "[t]he better considered cases regard full pardon x x x as relieving the party from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the disqualification or disabilities based on finding of guilt." J. Leonen went on to state that this "including phrase or inclusion" is not an authority in concluding that the grant of pardon ipso facto remits the accessory disqualifications or disabilities imposed on a convict regardless of whether the remission was explicitly stated,[86] citing the following reasons: First, J. Leonen maintains that the inclusion was not a pronouncement of a prevailing rule but was merely a statement made in the course of a comparative survey of cases during which the Court manifested a preference for "authorities [that reject] the unduly broad language of the Garland case."[87]
	GR No. 192856 2011-03-08	FERNANDO V. GONZALEZ v. COMELEC VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Moreover, there is nothing in the May 8, 2010 Resolution of the Second Division ordering the suspension of the proclamation of Gonzalez. From the language of Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 upon which the first paragraph of Section 16 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 was based, the Commission can order the suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate only upon motion during the pendency of the disqualification case. The Court has ruled that the suspension of proclamation of a winning candidate is not a matter which the COMELEC Second Division can dispose of motu proprio. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 requires that the suspension must be "upon motion by the complainant or any intervenor."[51]
	GR No. 180164 2008-06-17	FLORENTINO P. BLANCO v. COMELEC AZCUNA, J.
Relevant to this case is Codilla v. De Venecia,[13] which held that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, thus:...[T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature. Pursuant to sections 265 and 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, the power of the COMELEC is confined to the conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged offenders before the regular courts of justice, viz:
	GR NO. 174153 2006-10-25	RAUL L. LAMBINO v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
This is to certify further, that the total 68,359 registered voters of this municipality, as of the May 10, 2004 elections, 10,804 names with signatures were submitted for verification and out of which 10,301 were found to be legitimate voters as per official list of registered voters, which is equivalent to 15.07% of the total number of registered voters of this Municipality.[100]
	GR NO. 163088 2006-07-20	PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY v. PRIMEX COCO PRODUCTS CALLEJO, SR., J.
Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty.[30] A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.[31] When an official is required and authorized to do a prescribed act upon a prescribed contingency, his functions are ministerial only, and mandamus may be issued to control his action upon the happening of the contingency.[32]
	GR No. 158466 2004-06-15	PABLO V. OCAMPO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
The issues raised are not novel. In Codilla, Sr. vs. De Venecia,[10] we expounded on the application of Section 6, R.A. No. 6646. There, we emphasized that there must be a final judgment before the election in order that the votes of a disqualified candidate can be considered "stray", thus:"Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require a final judgment before the election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered "stray." Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified by final judgment during the election day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides." The obvious rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government.[11]
	GR No. 147589 AND GR No. 147613 2003-11-20	ANG BAGONG BAYANI v. COMELEC DAVIDE JR., C.J.
In contrast, the present Motion and Supplemental Motion are not even verified and are definitely not special civil actions; they were filed merely as purported incidents in these compliance proceedings. Furthermore, there is no showing that they were filed in the proper forum, considering that under the Constitution, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns and qualifications" of the members of the House of Representatives.[3] True, in Codilla v. Comelec ,[4] this Court ousted an incumbent member of Congress and caused the seating of the overwhelming winner during the election. However, that Decision was issued only after an independent petition for mandamus and quo warranto was filed by the proper party, and only after proper proceedings had been held thereon.
	GR Nos. 154796-97 2003-10-23	RAYMUNDO A. BAUTISTA v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
This Court agrees with the view of the Solicitor General. It is now settled doctrine that the COMELEC cannot proclaim as winner the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes in case the winning candidate is ineligible or disqualified.[48] The exception to this well-settled rule was mentioned in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections[49] and reiterated in Grego v. COMELEC.[50] However, the facts warranting the exception to the rule do not obtain in the present case.