This case has been cited 12 times or more.
|
2014-06-25 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
||||
| We do not agree, however, with the ruling of the appellate court that a certificate of title issued pursuant to a public land patent becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent.[27] A free patent obtained through fraud or misrepresentation is void. Hence, the one-year prescriptive period provided in the Public Land Act does not bar the State from asking for the reversion of property acquired through such means.[28] | |||||
|
2014-06-09 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
||||
| Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce. However, while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person given for the purpose of establishing the truth of the fact asserted in the statement is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement on the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor of such statement, was made. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when what is relevant is the fact that such statement has been made, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or is circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.[34] This is known as the doctrine of independently relevant statements.[35] | |||||
|
2010-07-07 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
||||
| It is evident from the foregoing jurisprudence that despite the lapse of one year from the entry of a decree of registration/certificate of title, the State, through the Solicitor General, may still institute an action for reversion when said decree/certificate was acquired by fraud or misrepresentation. Indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation. Well-settled is the doctrine that the registration of a patent under the Torrens system does not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the registrant's already existing one. Verily, registration under the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring ownership.[160] | |||||
|
2009-04-07 |
BRION, J. |
||||
| This situation is similar to that of Republic v. Heirs of Alejaga, Sr.[22] where the respondent obtained a loan of P100,000.00 in 1981 from the PNB, secured by a real estate mortgage on the patented land. The 1981 encumbrance was contracted two years from date of issuance of the patent in 1979, for which reason the Court cited a violation of Section 118 of the Public Land Act which proscribes the alienation or encumbrance of the patented land within five years from the date of the patent, and which proscription clearly appears as a proviso in the OCT issued in the name of the respondent in the case. Consequently, the PNB mortgage was declared void. | |||||
|
2009-01-29 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| In all actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon, the Republic of the Philippines is the real party in interest. The action shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.[23] Moreover, such action does not prescribe. Prescription and laches will not bar actions filed by the State to recover its property acquired through fraud by private individuals.[24] | |||||
|
2007-08-15 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
||||
| As early as 1999, this Court in Baguio v. Republic laid down the jurisprudence that: It is true that, once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property, and the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date of issuance of such patent.[78] The doctrine was reiterated in Republic v. Heirs of Felipe Alijaga, Sr.,[79] Heirs of Carlos Alcaraz v. Republic,[80] and the more recent case of Doris Chiongbian-Oliva v. Republic of the Philippines.[81] Thus, the 79-hectare reclaimed land became patrimonial property after the issuance of certificates of titles to the NHA based on Special Patents Nos. 3592 and 3598. | |||||
|
2007-08-14 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| In this case, Evangelista's testimony may be considered as an independently relevant statement, an exception to the hearsay rule, the purpose of which is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. Independent of the truth or the falsity of the statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant.[19] When Evangelista said that Rubia told her that it was petitioner who requested that the check be exchanged for cash, Evangelista was only testifying that Rubia told her of such request. It does not establish the truth or veracity of Rubia's statement since it is merely hearsay, as Rubia was not presented in court to attest to such utterance. On this score, evidence regarding the making of such independently relevant statement is not secondary but primary, because the statement itself may (a) constitute a fact in issue or (2) be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of that fact.[20] Indeed, independent of its truth or falsehood, Evangelista's statement is relevant to the issues of petitioner's falsehood, his authorship of the check in question and consequently, his culpability of the offense charged. | |||||
|
2007-04-27 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| On the first issue, C.A. No. 141, as amended, provides that lands of the public domain may be classified by the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, into: (1) alienable or disposable; (2) timber; and (3) mineral lands.[13] However, only alienable or disposable lands may be disposed of through any of the forms of concession enumerated in the law.[14] A free patent is one of such concessions[15] and once it is registered and the corresponding certificate of title issued, the land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property.[16] | |||||
|
2006-03-28 |
GARCIA, J. |
||||
| Well-settled is the rule that the party alleging fraud or mistake in a transaction bears the burden of proof.[17] The circumstances evidencing fraud are as varied as the people who perpetrate it in each case. It may assume different shapes and forms; it may be committed in as many different ways.[18] Thus, the law requires that fraud be established, not just by preponderance of evidence, but by clear and convincing evidence.[19] | |||||
|
2006-02-13 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| Thus, while it is true that the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when the fact that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.[16] For this reason, the statement attributed to Dominga regarding the source of the funds used to purchase the subject property related to the court by Margarita is admissible if only to establish the fact that such statement was made and the tenor thereof. | |||||
|
2003-12-05 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| Contrary to petitioners' protestations, we squarely resolved the core issues of fraud and want of jurisdiction afflicting the reconstitution of respondent's title. While we held that the issue of the validity of respondent's title is factual which cannot be reviewed on appeal, nevertheless, we have answered each ground raised by petitioner in assailing respondent's title.[7] Needless to stress, mere allegations of fraud are not enough.[8] Fraud is never presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence,[9] mere preponderance of evidence not even being adequate.[10] As we have held in Saguid vs. Court of Appeals, contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party's own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent's defense. [11] Petitioners failed to discharge that burden. | |||||