This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2014-07-23 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, entitles an illegally dismissed employee to reinstatement. Article 223 of the Labor Code requires the reinstatement to be immediately executory even pending appeal. With its intent being ostensibly to promote the benefit of the employee, Article 223 cannot be the source of any right of the employer to remove the employee should he fail to immediately comply with the order of reinstatement.[31] In Roquero, the Court ruled that the unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate the dismissed employee would entitle the latter to the payment of his salaries effective from the time when the employer failed to reinstate him; thus, it became the ministerial duty of the LA to implement the order of reinstatement.[32] According to Triad Security & Allied Services v. Ortega, Jr.,[33] the law mandates the prompt reinstatement of the dismissed or separated employee, without need of any writ of execution. In Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, [34] the Court has further observed: x x x The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award for reinstatement shall be immediately executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. The legislative intent is quite obvious, i.e., to make an award of reinstatement immediately enforceable, even pending appeal. To require the application for and issuance of a wit of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award would certainly betray and run counter to the very object and intent of Article 223, i.e., the immediate execution of a reinstatement order. The reason is simple. An application for a writ of execution and its issuance could be delayed for numerous reasons. A mere continuance of postponement of a scheduled hearing, for instance, or an inaction on the part of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC could easily delay the issuance of the writ thereby setting at naught the strict mandate and noble purpose envisioned by Article 223. In other words, if the requirements of Article 224 were to govern, as we so declared in Maranaw, then the executory nature of a reinstatement order or award contemplated by Article 223 will be unduly circumscribed and rendered ineffectual. In enacting the law, the legislature is presumed to have ordained a valid and sensible law, one which operates no further than may be necessary to achieve its specific purpose. Statutes, as a rule, are to be construed in the lights of the purpose to be achieved and the evil sought to be remedied. And where the statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. In introducing a new rule on the reinstatement aspect of a labor decision under R.A. No. 6715, Congress should not be considered to be indulging in mere semantic exercise. On appeal, however, the appellate tribunal concerned may enjoin or suspend the reinstatement order in the exercise of its sound discretion. | |||||
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2008-02-22 |
TINGA, J, |
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| It is a fundamental rule that when a judgment becomes final and executory it becomes immutable and unalterable, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the issuance of a writ of execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court. The writ of execution must conform to the judgment to be executed and adhere strictly to the very essential particulars.[8] | |||||
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2007-04-03 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| As to the affidavits executed by two NSTSI employees to the effect that each of them saw Zeta on October 19, 1998[41] and October 28, 1998[42] as a conductor of Barbra Ann Bus Line, we find these not only self-serving but also not sufficient proof that respondent abandoned his employment with NSTSI.[43] As earlier stated, NSTSI failed to discharge its burden of presenting evidence to prove abandonment on the part of Zeta. Certainly, Zeta cannot be faulted for seeking an alternative employment after he was barred from resuming his work on October 18, 1998 with NSTSI for he must continue to feed, shelter and clothe himself and his family. | |||||
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2005-12-16 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The reliefs afforded to employees whose employment were unlawfully severed are reinstatement and payment of full backwages. Reinstatement restores the employee to the position from which he was removed, i.e., to his status quo ante dismissal, while the grant of backwages allows the same employee to recover from the employer that which he lost by way of wages because of his dismissal.[18] | |||||
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2004-11-25 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| Under Republic Act No. 6715, employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full backwages, among others, computed from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement. If reinstatement is no longer possible, the backwages shall be computed from the time of their illegal termination up to the finality of the decision.[35] | |||||