This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2009-01-20 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Appellant's defenses of denial and alibi in this case are not worthy of belief, given that he failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the time and place of the crime.[26] Established is the rule that denial and alibi, if not substantiated by clear and convincing proof, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.[27] | |||||
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2009-01-19 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| In a criminal case, the prosecution must prove two things: (1) the fact of the crime; and (2) the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime.[31] Here, there is no question on the existence of the first element, as in fact, the killing of Danilo is admitted by the parties. The appellant only puts in issue the second. The Court finds, however, that, in this case, the prosecution fulfilled its bounden duty to establish the identity of the assailant as the perpetrator of the crime. | |||||
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2008-11-03 |
BRION, J. |
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| In our view, these joint actions sufficiently point to a common design to end the life of the victim. Thus, the act of one acting pursuant to this design is deemed the act of all.[47] | |||||
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2008-10-06 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| The elements of murder, penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by accused; (3) the killing is attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide.[45] | |||||
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2008-06-27 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The Court has held that where the testimony of a witness is in conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind, it deserves great evidentiary value.[87] | |||||
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2006-04-18 |
PANGANIBAN, CJ |
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| Basic is the rule that this Court accords great weight and a high degree of respect to factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, as in the present case.[13] Here, the RTC was unequivocally upheld by the CA, which was clothed with the power to review whether the trial court's conclusions were in accord with the facts and the relevant laws.[14] Indeed, the findings of the trial court are not to be disturbed on appeal, unless it has overlooked or misinterpreted some facts or circumstances of weight and substance.[15] Although there are recognized exceptions[16] to the conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the trial and the appellate courts, petitioner has not convinced this Court of the existence of any. | |||||
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2004-06-29 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| As to damages, the award by the trial court of P50,000 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim is correct and should be sustained. In addition, considering the wound inflicted on the victim that caused his death, and the anguish suffered by the victim's heirs, moral damages in the amount of P50,000 should also be awarded.[79] | |||||
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2003-09-29 |
PUNO, J. |
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| The trial court also found that the offenses were committed with abuse of superior strength. The malefactors not only outnumbered the victims; at least two of them were armed. More, the circumstances clearly show that the assailants deliberately took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the crime. Nevertheless, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed by treachery.[95] | |||||
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2003-01-13 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Appellant's claim that he did not take flight immediately after the incident; that nobody saw him running away from the building and that he in fact talked with Edith Aquino, has no probative value so as to exculpate him from liability. As we have held in People vs. Omar,[58] non-flight may not be construed as an indication of innocence.[59] There is no law or dictum holding that non-flight of an accused is conclusive proof of innocence.[60] In the more recent case of People vs. Delmo,[61] the appellants therein claimed that none of them fled despite opportunities to do so which should be credited to them as an indication of their innocence. To this contention we held that "[w]hile it is true that we have ruled that flight is evidence of guilt, there is no law or dictum holding that staying put is proof of innocence, for the Court is not blind to the cunning ways of a wolf which, after a kill, may feign innocence and choose not to flee.[62] | |||||