This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2011-07-04 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Indeed, mere presence at the scene of the incident, by itself, is not a sufficient ground to hold a person liable as a conspirator. However, conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which when taken together indicate that they are parts of the scheme to commit the crime. In the present case, Bingky's presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission as testified to by prosecution eyewitness Lester was never rebutted. According to Lester, Danny arrived first at the scene of the crime followed by Bingky. During the stabbing incident, Bingky was around three meters away from Danny. Immediately after the incident, both appellants scampered away. [35] To the mind of the Court, Bingky's presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission was not just a chance encounter with Danny. His overt act of keeping himself around served no other purpose than to lend moral support by ensuring that no one could give succor to the victim. His presence at the scene has no doubt, encouraged Danny and increased the odds against the victim. One who participates in the material execution of the crime by standing guard or lending moral support to the actual perpetration thereof is criminally responsible to the same extent as the actual perpetrator. [36] Moreover, the record is bereft of any hint that Bingky endeavored to avert the stabbing of the victim despite the particular distance between them. Under the circumstances, we can hardly accept that Bingky has nothing to do with the killing. No conclusion can be drawn from the acts of Bingky except that he consented and approved the acts of his co-accused in stabbing the victim. Once conspiracy is established, the act of one is deemed the act of all. It matters not who among the accused actually killed the victim. Thus, the trial court did not err in its ruling that conspiracy existed between appellants in the commission of the crime charged. | |||||
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2010-12-14 |
ABAD, J. |
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| One who participates in the material execution of the crime by standing guard or lending moral support to the actual perpetrators thereof is criminally responsible to the same extent as the latter. There being conspiracy among the accused-appellants, they are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation.[166] | |||||
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2004-07-12 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Appellants alleged that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of a conspiracy among the seven accused, as it did not show a common plan or design among them. We find otherwise. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. As a rule, conspiracy must be proved as convincingly and indubitably as the crime itself. It is not necessary, however, that conspiracy be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused which show a joint or common purpose and design, a concerted action and a community of interest among the accused.[7] | |||||
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2004-06-29 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[65] It may be appreciated even if there is no direct evidence to show an actual agreement to commit the crime, when the acts and attendant circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime reflect a common design, thus making all the accused co-principals in the crime committed. It can be proven by evidence of a chain of circumstances and may be inferred from the acts of all the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to and are indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest.[66] It is not even necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim, because once conspiracy is established, an act of one is the act of all.[67] | |||||
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2003-03-14 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| Finally, as to the civil liability imposed by the trial court, some modifications are in order. The trial court erred in awarding actual damages in the amount of P24,220. To recover actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, on the basis of competent proof and the best evidence obtainable.[30] The prosecution in this case merely presented the testimony of the victim's heir, and a list of funeral and burial expenses made by the same witness without producing any receipt or other evidence to support the claim. There was thus no sufficient proof to sustain the trial court's award of actual damages. Be that as it may, considering that it cannot be denied that the heirs suffered some pecuniary loss though the exact amount cannot be proved with certainty, an award of P25,000 by way of temperate damages is appropriate.[31] In addition to this, this Court likewise grants the amount of P25,000 as exemplary damages given the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.[32] The civil indemnity for the victim in the amount of P50,000 is sustained. | |||||